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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Modest growth ahead 
– but still behind on 
Lisbon Agenda 
EUROFRAME - European Forecasting Network predicts that the Euro 
Area economy will experience a modest rate of output growth in 2005 with a 
gradual pick-up in activity by the second half of the year and into 2006. Our 
forecast for output growth in real GDP terms is 1.5 per cent in 2005 followed 
by a rise to 2.0 per cent in 2006. The Euro Area is experiencing a faltering 
recovery back towards rates that are more in line with its estimated potential 
after almost a half-decade of underachievement. The performance of the Euro 
Area continues to lag behind that predicted for US economic growth over the 
next two years. The ambition, retained within the refocused Lisbon Agenda, to 
make the European Union the most dynamic and competitive economy in the 
world remains a formidable challenge, though a clearer emphasis upon 
economic growth is an important restarting point. 
 
Summary of Key Forecast Indicators for Euro Area 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
     
Output Growth Rate  1.6 0.9 0.5 1.8 1.5 2.0 
Inflation Rate 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 
Unemployment Rate 8.0 8.4 8.9 8.9 9.0 8.8 
Government Balance 
as % of GDP -1.7 -2.4 -2.7 -2.7 -2.6 -2.5 
  
 
Risk from a further 
appreciation of the 
euro… 
World economic growth over 2005-2006 is expected to be at its strongest level 
in a generation with rates of the order of 4.5 per cent providing a favourable 
trading background for a resumption of strong Euro Area activity growth. 
However, given that the Euro Area’s weak growth performance in recent years 
has been primarily due to the competitiveness losses arising from the strength 
of the currency, European fortunes will be inextricably linked to exchange rate 
movements. The main threat for sharp effective exchange rate movement 
depends on how global macroeconomic imbalances are played out over the 
coming few years.   
 
…due to 
unsustainable 
developments in the 
US and China 
In this context it is not clear-cut that the dollar/euro exchange rate has much 
further to fall even if the effective exchange rate would fall to ensure 
sustainability of the US current account. However, if the Chinese renminbi and 
other Asian currencies are not re-valued, the euro exchange rate may come 
under greater pressure as demand for euro-based assets could easily rise as they 
are the main alternatives to assets denominated in the US dollars. 
 
Correction through 
higher US savings...  
The correction of global imbalances has to occur mainly through higher US 
private savings required to restore balance to its triple deficits – trade, 
government and households. This may reduce world demand and dampen 
Euro Area growth through decreases in export demand and deterioration in 
 
price competitiveness. The full impact would depend upon the nature of the 
shock and the response of the monetary authorities. For example, if a 10 per 
cent US housing and equity price decline triggered the balancing, the Euro 
Area output would be around 0.3 per cent below the base line in the first year 
and would only recover slowly thereafter. The exchange rate changes implied 
by the simulation are rather modest.  
…. with a modest 
impact on euro’s 
value  
 
 
Oil price most likely 
not a threat to the 
recovery … 
The nature of the oil price shock resulting from increased demand in 
developing countries, and especially in China, impacts negatively on the Euro 
Area in terms of both output and inflation. It is estimated that the losses for 
the Euro Area are not that significant, with the main impact coming through a 
change in the terms of trade. The overall long-run effect will depend on oil 
intensity, trade patterns and policy flexibility. If we assume that the oil price 
will rise permanently by US$5 above the baseline, Euro Area GDP growth 
would decrease only 0.1 percentage points in the first two years. To a 
significant extent there would be a recycling of the oil revenue through 
increased imports by oil producers. High world economic growth reveals that 
oil prices are not a major threat to recovery. 
 
 
… weak spot 
remains domestic 
demand in the Euro 
Area 
 
While the external environment is important, explanations for the weak growth 
performance of the Euro Area must also focus upon domestic demand 
deficiencies. The appreciation of the euro can definitely not explain poor 
domestic demand. Monetary policy has not been restrictive, and interest rates 
in real inflation-adjusted terms are low, yet consumption growth remains weak 
with some modest investment recovery underway. The influence of 
discretionary fiscal policy has been close to neutral at the aggregate level in 
2004 but still has made only a limited contribution to domestic demand in 
recent years.   
 
 
Policy-mix tightening 
ahead but inflation 
under control…  
 
The policy-mix forecast for this year and next is for the European Central 
Bank to tighten interest rates by 0.75 percentage points, while fiscal policy is 
expected to be broadly neutral this year and slightly restrictive next year. 
Interest rates in nominal terms are rather low if we use a standard Taylor Rule 
and inputs from our model based forecast. Therefore, much uncertainty is 
attached to estimates of output gaps, and on estimates like those from of the 
OECD and the European Commission, forecast interest rates may be 
appropriate and in line with the target inflation rate. Our forecast for price 
inflation is for a rate of 2 per cent in 2005 and 1.8 per cent in 2006.  
 
 
The three largest economies of the Euro Area are expected to exceed the 3 per 
cent deficit of the SGP, with the overall Euro Area public deficits averaging 
around 2.5 per cent both this year and next. The influence of discretionary 
fiscal policy was close to neutral in recent years in the Euro Area, such that the 
increase in fiscal deficits was due to poor economic performance. Discretionary 
fiscal policy in the Euro Area did not contribute to domestic demand in recent 
years, which was in sharp contrast to the US and the UK.  
… while fiscal policy 
has been neutral in 
recent years… 
 
Two views are expressed within EUROFRAME-EFN institutes on the 
Council’s agreement reached on 22 March 2005 on the implementation of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Some of us are worried that the agreement will be 
detrimental to budgetary discipline and will lead to higher government deficits 
and insufficient budgetary consolidation. Some of us regret that criteria such as 
the 3 per cent of GDP threshold remain: they would like the policy framework 
to prevent negative externalities to occur (excessive inflation, current account 
deficits) and domestic fiscal autonomy to be reaffirmed. 
 
 
... but high 
unemployment rates 
persisting 
 
The host of deficiencies across the Euro Area economies point to the need to 
address specific policy measures at solving seemingly intractable problems such 
as the high rates of unemployment. Our forecasts for unemployment rates in 
the Euro Area are 9 per cent this year and 8.8 per cent next year.  
  
Relocation: where do 
we stand? … 
 
 
Visible disadvantages and much less visible gains characterise the impact of 
international relocation of production on the EU economy. This Report’s 
special topic shows that relocation requires sectoral restructuring, causes job 
losses, affects the position of low-skilled workers, and may intensify tax 
competition. However, these disadvantages should be seen in perspective. 
Trade with and direct investment in low-wage countries are rising fast, but still 
take up a relatively small part of the total. Most of EU countries’ trade and 
capital flows take place with the US or other European countries. Hence, job 
losses due to relocation are relatively small. Also, relocation only to a limited 
extent weakens the position of low-skilled workers, which manifests itself in 
unemployment or growing wage differentials with high-skilled workers. 
Technological change is more important for the disparity between low-skilled 
and high-skilled workers. Moreover, a part of relocation is not motivated by 
low-cost competition, but by access to foreign markets or foreign suppliers. 
 
 
Gains from relocation countervail the disadvantages. Larger international trade 
and capital flows reduce import prices, create opportunities for productive 
companies, expand product variety and foster international learning. Relocation 
also enables companies to increase their productivity. More productive 
companies reduce their prices or pay higher wages, thus benefiting customers 
and workers. These advantages spread out across the economy and are less 
visible than direct disadvantages.  
 
…policies should 
respond 
 
Visibility of losses and gains from relocation is also relevant for policy makers. 
Policy makers need to take both sides of the coin into account when they want 
to make informed decisions and when they participate in the public debate. 
Policy makers can facilitate sectoral shifts and skill upgrading to enhance 
Europe’s comparative advantage in high-skilled activities. R&D warrants 
special attention because relocation of R&D entails the risk of a loss of 
associated knowledge spillovers. To prevent tax competition, policy 
co-ordination on corporate taxes seems desirable. Last and somewhat least 
from the perspective of relocation, but certainly not least from the perspective 
of technological change: in their design of social security provisions, policy 
makers face an awkward dilemma between greater income inequality and 
higher unemployment of low-skilled workers. 
 
 
 
 
1. OUTLOOK FOR THE 
EURO AREA 
Global economic activity has weakened somewhat in recent months after 
accelerating considerably in the first half of 2004. The primary cause of this 
slowdown lies in high and volatile oil prices, while for the Euro Area the 
depreciation of the US dollar also plays a role. We anticipate a rebound in 
activity in the second half of 2005 and in 2006, predicated on the unwinding of 
growth in oil prices. Overall, we expect global GDP growth to be around 4.5 
per cent this year before moderating slightly to 4.3 per cent in 2006. These 
forecasts are consistent with the world economy operating at around potential. 
In line with this slowdown in international growth, world trade growth is likely 
to decelerate from around 9 per cent in 2004 to 7.3 per cent in 2005 and 5 per 
cent in 2006. Oil prices are expected to decline moderately from mid-2005 with 
average prices forecast to be around $41 per barrel in 2005 and $39 per barrel 
in 2006. 
1.1  
Overview 
Despite a modest rebound in Euro Area activity last year, growth continues 
to lag behind that of the world’s major economies. The recovery lost 
momentum as the year progressed and real GDP increased by a disappointing 
0.2 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2004 compared to the previous quarter. 
However, we anticipate this slowdown to be temporary, and that a recovery 
will be underway by the second quarter of 2005. Our view is that the Euro 
Area will grow by a modest 1.5 per cent this year and when the recovery takes 
hold in 2006 growth of 2.0 per cent is expected. This is broadly in line with 
potential, but insufficient to reduce the current output gap. Domestic demand 
is expected to make a stronger contribution to growth, while the continued 
appreciation of the euro will result in a smaller contribution to growth from the 
external sector. 
The outlook for prices in the Euro Area is for inflation to moderate. We 
project inflation to be 2.0 per cent this year before moderating further to 1.8 
per cent in 2006. We anticipate limited second-round effects of recent oil price 
increases. Limited monetary tightening is anticipated to begin in the second 
half of 2005, with interest rates expected to rise gradually as the economy 
strengthens. The larger Euro Area economies, that currently have a deficit 
above the 3 per cent GDP limit of the Maastricht Treaty, are forecast to make 
modest progress in fiscal consolidation over the next two years. This will result 
in the overall general government deficit declining slightly to 2.6 per cent in 
2005 and 2.5 per cent in 2006. 
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2 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO AREA 
Table 1.1: Euro Area Forecast of Key Indicators 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 Annual percentage changes  
GDP 1.6 0.9 0.5 1.8 1.5 2.0 
Harmonised Consumer 
Prices 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 
 Levels 
Standardised 
unemploymenta  8.0 8.4 8.9 8.9 9.0 8.8 
Government financial 
balanceb -1.7 -2.4 -2.7 -2.7 -2.6 -2.5 
a As percentage of total labour force 
b As a percentage of GDP 
 
Despite improving growth prospects for the Euro Area, several downside 
risks pose a threat to our forecast. These are mainly externally driven and 
include increasing volatility in oil prices (see box in Section 1.3) and the impact 
of persistent and increasing global imbalances on the Euro Area (see Section 
1.2).  On the upside, current inflation and interest rates in the Euro Area have 
yielded very low real interest rates, which could help increase business 
investment. 
  
 
DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK OUTSIDE THE EURO AREA 
1.2  
Short Term 
Economic 
Outlook 
Growth in the world’s main economies has remained relatively robust despite 
some deceleration in recent months. In the last quarter of 2004, strong growth 
in the US and China helped to overcome the negative contribution from Japan 
to global growth. Inflationary pressures are beginning to mount, particularly in 
the US, with OECD inflation forecast to increase from 2.0 per cent in 2004 by 
0.3 percentage points both this year and next. We will see some monetary 
tightening in the world’s major economies over the forecast horizon. Oil prices 
are expected to decline moderately from mid-2005. The robust world growth 
forecast in the near term, albeit at a more moderate rate than last year, will 
ensure Euro Area foreign demand remains relatively strong.  
UNITED STATES  
Fuelled by burgeoning domestic demand, US GDP growth remained robust 
last year. However, growth decelerated slightly to 3.9 per cent per annum in the 
final quarter of 2004. There are few signs that economic activity in the US will 
shift away from consumer and government spending and investment and 
towards exports this year, as monetary policy remains accommodative and 
there is little indication of fiscal prudence in the current federal budget 
negotiations between the White House and Congress. As a result, we expect 
US GDP growth to be 3.6 per cent this year and slightly less in 2006, with the 
economy operating near full capacity. 
As the dollar continues on its downward trajectory we forecast the annual 
rate of inflation in the US to be somewhat higher than in the recent past, 
averaging over 3.0 per cent in 2006. Given strong asset prices and the weak 
exchange rate then interest rates may have been set to produce a more 
expansionary monetary policy in the US in February of this year than in the 
previous May just before tightening began. In spite of this, there are few 
indications that the US monetary authorities are prepared to raise the federal 
funds rate at anything other than “the measured pace” – we forecast short-
term US interest rates to reach only 3.25 per cent by the end of this year, rising 
further to just over 4.0 per cent in 2006, a level which hardly qualifies as 
neutral. This, in combination with a weaker dollar, suggests that annual 
inflation in the US will grow somewhat faster than in the recent past. Supply-
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side indicators also point to a pick-up in inflation rate in the US over the near 
term. The deceleration in productivity is well underway – non-farm labour 
productivity grew by 2.5 per cent on an annual basis in the last quarter of 2004 
as compared to the annual growth rate of 5.5 per cent during the first half of 
last year. As a direct consequence, labour costs per unit of output have begun 
to increase, adding further impetus to inflation resulting in a more rapid 
increase this year than in 2004.  
The US imbalances – external, government and household – continue 
unabated. In the final quarter of last year, the US current account deficit, 
driven by a massive trade deficit, widened to over 6 per cent of the country’s 
GDP for the first time. Preliminary data for the first few months of this year 
indicate that the US trade deficit continues to widen, as import growth 
outpaced that of exports. However, it should be noted that the ongoing dollar 
depreciation against major currencies – with the notable exception of China – 
is beginning to have an impact on the external imbalance, as trade deficits with 
key trading partners such as Canada and Europe are beginning to narrow. In 
this context, it is not clear-cut that the dollar/euro exchange rate has much 
further to fall even if the effective exchange rate falls to ensure sustainability of 
the US current account. However, if the Chinese renminbi is not re-valued, the 
euro exchange rate may come under greater pressure as demand for euro-based 
assets could easily rise as they are the main alternatives to US dollar 
denominated assets. 
JAPAN  
Official revisions show that the recovery in economic activity in Japan was less 
robust than originally estimated. The latest revisions to the newly applied 
chain-linked Japanese national accounts data showed that economic growth not 
only softened from the second quarter of 2004 but that the economy was in 
fact in a technical recession as it contracted by 0.3 per cent in both the second 
and third quarters of last year. While the economic contraction did not extend 
to the fourth quarter, the economy only grew by a weak 0.1 per cent in the last 
quarter of 2004. These data reinforce our view that the Japanese recovery 
remains fragile despite the significant structural improvements in the corporate 
and banking sector. In particular, consumer and business confidence in the 
economy appears to be easily quelled by temporary external shocks such as the 
global inventory adjustment in specific IT-related sectors in 2004. 
 From the disappointing national accounts data, one would never have 
concluded that the Japanese corporate sector is actually at its healthiest in the 
post-bubble era. Balance sheet restructuring and non-performing loans disposal 
have more or less been completed, while double digit corporate profit growth 
since the end of 2003 have resulted in high levels of free cash flow. These 
would usually translate into higher labour compensation and, in turn, higher 
consumption as well as high investment as capacity expansion activities pick 
up. However, in the current continuing deflationary environment, both the 
corporate and household sectors remain extremely cautious and real recovery 
may be delayed into 2006. The current investment recovery has been patchy 
with year-on-year private sector investment growth falling from 8.6 per cent in 
the last quarter of 2003 to 1.6 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2004. Although 
signs of a rebound in the economy have emerged in the last few months as 
various coincidental and leading indicators improved, we forecast growth to 
remain weak in 2005 as a whole with the economy expanding by 0.8 per cent as 
the corporate and household sectors rebuild their confidence.  
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REST OF ASIA  
Despite the sustained increase in oil prices in 2004, growth in Asia excluding 
Japan remained resilient last year. Most importantly, economic fundamentals 
within the region continued to improve as economies slowly shifted their 
reliance on export led growth to internally generated Asian demand growth. 
Much of the growth in the rest of Asia comes from China which has become 
the engine of growth for the region, while domestic demand in individual 
economies is also benefiting from low real interest rates. 
Prospects for the region in the coming two years remain bright as China has 
successfully achieved a soft landing. With Chinese exports showing renewed 
signs of strength in the latest data releases, assisted by the weak US dollar, we 
expect growth in China to remain strong in 2005 before decelerating in 2006. 
Growth in the region will in turn remain robust. Nonetheless, key risks remain, 
especially that of overheating in China because asset inflation remains high. 
Preventing an asset bubble is likely to be the key challenge for the Chinese 
authorities in the coming year as pressure for the renminbi to appreciate 
continues. 
UK  
The UK expanded strongly in 2004, with GDP growth of 3.1 per cent per 
annum. Growth is expected to moderate this year and next, but to remain 
slightly above the rate for trend GDP. Growth this year and next is forecast to 
be more balanced than in previous years. Slowing household consumption 
expenditure growth is expected to be compensated for by growth in business 
investment and exports. We expect the trade balance to begin to provide a 
positive contribution to growth. Weaker than expected world demand remains 
a risk to the economy but, more particularly, weak growth in domestic demand 
in the European Union remains a downside risk to UK exports, and 
consequently UK growth.  
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES  
According to the first published estimates, GDP growth accelerated in almost 
all of the ten new member states in 2004. The weighted average growth rate for 
the ten countries was 5.0 per cent. Domestic demand grew substantially in all 
countries. However, the emphasis has now shifted: private consumption 
growth declined due to the inflation upturn, whereas investment outlays 
showed strong dynamics based on continued foreign investment inflow and 
public infrastructure projects. Foreign trade contributed negatively to growth in 
most countries (excluding Poland, Hungary and Estonia), however, the 
negative contributions decreased in some countries compared with the 
previous year owing to dynamic world demand and EU accession.  
On average, GDP growth will slow down in 2005 and remain broadly on 
that level in 2006 (with rates of 4.2 per cent and 4.3 per cent respectively 
forecast), mainly as a result of reduced world demand and the currency 
appreciation recorded during 2004. Additionally, some one-off measures 
(opening of EU markets and implementation of EU rules to third countries, 
accumulation of reserves in the economy) will not take place in the upcoming 
years.  
Last year the Scandinavian economies of Sweden and Denmark expanded 
at or above the average rate of GDP growth for the Euro Area as a whole with 
considerably lower rates of inflation. In Norway a domestic demand recovery is 
gaining momentum. It has been driven largely by increased oil investment that 
has coincided with the recent rise in crude oil prices.  
Russia continues to rely on oil exports as the principal engine of economic 
growth and the latest economic data corroborate this view. Russia’s GDP 
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growth rate is expected to continue in high single digits this year and next, as 
oil prices have shown few signs of receding during the first quarter of this year. 
WORLD CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES A KEY RISK TO THE 
FORECAST 
Current-account balances are at present very unevenly distributed across the 
world economy. The US current-account deficit is especially large, and reached 
$666 billion, i.e. 5.7 per cent of GDP, in 2004. Summers (2004) has already 
noted that the US deficit represents two-thirds of the surpluses of other 
countries. According to Debelle and Galati (2005), most of the thresholds, 
beyond which adjustment in the current-account balance typically occurs, have 
been passed. However, in our baseline forecast we assume that the external 
debt stock can be kept in check, in part, because the US dollar is a key 
currency. Most US liabilities are expressed in dollars while many assets are 
priced in foreign currencies. In contrast to other industrialised countries, a 
possible depreciation would reduce the US’s sizeable foreign net debt, which 
would ease the short-run negative effect of depreciation. 
Chart 1.1  Current Account in Selected Countries and Groups 
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A closer look at the US saving-investment balance, which is behind the 
current-account deficit, shows that the current situation differs from the “twin 
deficits” period of the late 1980s; today’s case is more one of triple deficits 
than twin deficits. In addition to deficits in the current account and general 
government finances, the financial balance of households is also deeply in 
deficit. On the other hand, the business sector has implemented measures to 
bring its financial balance into considerable surplus in recent times (see  e.g., de 
Carvalho and Suni (2003)). The large stock of debt accumulated by the 
external, government and household sectors makes the US economy very 
vulnerable to shocks, and thus represents one of the key risks to the forecast 
(see more in the article released on the EFN web site). 
In the literature examining the adjustment of the US current account deficit, 
e.g., Blanchard et al., (2005) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004), limited emphasis 
is placed on the importance of adjustment in the domestic saving-investment 
imbalance, a channel of adjustment that is treated in more detail in the NiGEM 
model. However, these studies show that a substantial adjustment is very 
probable and would be associated with large exchange rate changes. 
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EFFECTS OF BALANCING GREATLY DEPEND ON THE SOURCE 
OF THE SHOCK AND ON THE POLICY REACTIONS 
The current account balance is only a reflection of economic processes in the 
global economy. The balancing of world current accounts calls for a rise in 
domestic saving in the US relative to saving elsewhere. We analyse the 
balancing using the NiGEM model and extend the analysis of Al-Eyd, Barrell 
and Pomerantz (2005). They argue that an exchange rate shock alone or, more 
generally, a monetary shock would have sizeable short-term effects, but would 
not significantly improve the imbalances over the longer term. Shocks to the 
US such as tax increases, a decrease in housing prices or a sustained rise in the 
risk premium have permanent effects by changing behaviour. Naturally, a 
strong recovery in the Japanese and Euro Area economies would also balance 
the global situation in a favourable way.1 
According to Al-Eyd et al., fiscal contraction in the US would reduce output 
growth and improve the current account. An autonomous rise in US saving 
would also reduce US output growth and have negative spill-over effects on 
the Euro Area. Monetary loosening in the US and a temporary rise in the risk 
premium on US assets would generate a fall in the exchange rate, with an 
immediate worsening of the trade balance due to the J curve effect, and the US 
current account would improve only temporarily. In the former case the Euro 
Area might experience an increase in growth, whilst in the latter the negative 
impacts of the appreciation of the euro would be offset by a fall in real interest 
rates. 
THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN DOMESTIC SAVINGS 
We have argued above that savings imbalances in the US are a major part of 
the imbalances problem, and thus we focus on changing the level of private 
sector saving in the US. Using NiGEM, we analyse the implications of a 10 per 
cent fall in house prices, and then a 10 per cent fall in both housing and equity 
prices. Finally, we simulate the effects of a rise in consumption in Japan and 
Europe. 
In all three cases the US current account improves, but in the first two 
Euro Area output falls below its baseline trajectory because world demand is 
lower. The size of these effects depends on changes in (long-term real) interest 
rates and their impact on investment, which partly offsets the fall in 
consumption. 
The most important part of the model for the transmission of saving 
shocks is clearly consumption, especially in the US, as shown in Barrell and 
Davis (2004).  Changes in house prices feed into tangible wealth, and have five 
times the impact of a change in equity prices in the short run, but the same 
effect in the long run. A one per cent fall in real house prices reduces 
consumption by 0.15 per cent in the short run and by more in the long run 
even before the feed through effects on the rest of the economy are taken into 
account.  
During the last five years real house prices in the US have risen by 25 per 
cent and household debt has expanded substantially by around 40 per cent in 
real terms. Both have reached levels which could lead to correction. We analyse 
a simulated fall in house prices of 10 per cent at the beginning of 2005. A 
decline of this magnitude would reduce consumption by more than 1 per cent 
 
1 It should be emphasised that the exchange rate is an endogenous variable (both in the model 
and the real world). It is not possible to give a simple answer to the question – what are the 
effects of a fall in the dollar? Effects will depend on the reasons for the fall. For instance, it is 
possible that a monetary expansion in the US will cause the dollar to fall, but will expand world 
demand so much that Euro Area output could even rise. On the other hand, a fall in the dollar 
associated with weak US demand would be accompanied with a decline in output growth in the 
Euro Area. 
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in the first year and slow growth markedly, as can be seen from Chart 1.3. If it 
were accompanied by a similar fall in equity prices, the impacts on the US 
economy would be much larger, as can be seen from the Chart 1.3. A fall in 
equity prices reduces both real financial wealth and the ability of firms to raise 
finance and hence would rapidly reduce investment.2 
 
Chart 1.2  Impact of Asset Price Falls on Consumption 
 
Chart 1.3  Impact of US Asset Price Falls on GDP ( per cent diff from base)* 
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A fall in saving in the Euro Area and Japan would have an expansionary 
impact on these economies, which in turn would reduce the current account 
imbalances between these areas and the US. The simulation is done by 
changing the intercept in the consumption equation for each Euro Area 
country. In the first year the saving rate falls by one percentage point. Falling 
saving rates lead to a reduction in wealth accumulation, which impacts the 
 
2 Equity prices are a forward looking variable in our model, and we engineer a 10 per cent fall by 
raising the equity premium, and hence the discount rate on future profits. 
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future path of consumption. Higher demand induces a rise in interest rates 
which would put upward pressure on exchange rates, and higher long rates 
would reduce wealth. These factors would help offset the initial expansionary 
effects on consumption and demand. Output growth would rise markedly in 
the Euro Area and Japan, but a stronger dollar and higher interest rates would 
weaken growth in the US. Chart 1.4 plots the impacts of these increases in 
consumption on the US current account. 
 
Table 1.2  Effects of higher consumption in Japan and the Euro Area, ( per 
cent difference from base) 
Output  
 Japan Euro Area US 
2005 0.9 0.3 -0.1 
2006 0.6 0.4 -0.2 
 
Chart 1.4  Increased Consumption in Japan and the Euro Area: Impact on 
Current Balances 
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1.3  
Developments 
and Outlook of 
the Euro Area 
OVERVIEW AND DETAIL OF FORECAST 
 
Recent economic developments have been disappointing in the Euro Area. 
Economic growth weakened significantly in the second half of the year, after a 
rather unimpressive performance in the first half. In the fourth quarter, real 
GDP increased by a meagre 0.2 per cent quarter-on-quarter unchanged from 
the previous quarter and compared with average growth of 0.7 per cent in the 
first half of 2004. It is likely that statistical working day adjustments help to 
explain some of the poor fourth quarter performance as there were 
approximately four extra working days in 2004 compared with 2003 and the 
numbers given are calendar adjusted. The impact of this on the annual growth 
rate is substantial- real GDP in 2004 is estimated to have increased at an annual 
rate of 2.0 per cent on a non-working day adjusted basis although on an 
adjusted basis it is estimated to have increased by 1.8 per cent.3 
Overall Euro Area growth in 2004 was not broadly based and was 
characterised by strong export growth and weak domestic demand. However, 
in the last quarter of 2004, the contribution of domestic demand to quarterly 
3 All GDP data and forecasts discussed in the text and described in the tables are adjusted for 
working-day variation. 
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growth strengthened due to a rebound in consumer expenditure coupled with 
continued buoyant investment growth. The Euro Area was hit by the strong 
appreciation of the euro in the final quarter of 2004. This has served to 
dampen export growth by adversely affecting the competitiveness of the Euro 
Area. 
Chart 1.5:  Euro Area, forward-looking indicators 
OECD Composite Leading Indicator for the Euro Area 
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We feel that the Euro Area is currently experiencing a temporary lull in 
growth due to high and volatile oil prices and the strong appreciation of the 
euro and that it will return to a more favourable trajectory, after a slow start in 
2005. Leading indicators of activity show that a pick-up in activity in the very 
near term is unlikely. The leading quarterly indicators produced by OFCE and 
NIESR suggest that growth in the first quarter of 2005 could be as low as 0.2 
per cent compared to the previous quarter.4 The EUROFRAME Euro Growth 
Indicator also shows a deceleration in the growth rate in the near term.5 The 
 
4 See Charpin F., “OFCE quarterly GDP indicators” and Weale M., “Monthly GDP for the US 
and the Euro Area”. These papers are available at www.euroframe.org/efn. 
5 The EUROFRAME Euro Growth Indicator is updated every month and is available at 
www.euro-frame.org/indicator/index.php. 
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first quarter is forecast to be stronger than these indicators suggest, in part 
because of a carryover to demand of high levels of (working day unadjusted) 
incomes in the fourth quarter. We anticipate that growth will gather 
momentum in the second half of this year (see Chart 1.6) but that the Euro 
Area will expand only moderately over the next two years. For 2005 as a whole, 
real GDP is projected to increase by 1.5 per cent before strengthening to rise 
by 2 per cent next year. 
Chart 1.6:  Euro Area Output Growth  
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Table 1.3  Euro Area Forecast 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 Annual percentage 
Volume       
Consumption 1.9 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.5 
Private investment -0.4 -3.4 -1.0 1.3 2.7 3.1 
Government expenditure 2.3 2.8 1.5 1.7 1.2 1.4 
Stockbuildinga -0.6 -0.1 0.4 0.5 0.1 -0.1 
Total domestic demand 1.0 0.3 1.2 1.8 1.6 1.7 
Export volumes 3.5 1.9 0.2 5.6 5.7 4.9 
Import volumes 1.8 0.5 2.0 5.9 6.1 4.4 
GDP 1.6 0.9 0.5 1.8 1.5 2.0 
Average earnings 3.6 3.3 2.8 2.9 2.0 2.4 
Harmonised consumer prices 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 
Private consumption deflator 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.7 
Real personal disposable income 2.6 1.2 0.9 1.6 1.6 1.3 
 Levels  
Standardised unemploymentb  8.0 8.4 8.9 8.9 9.0 8.8 
Government financial balancec -1.7 -2.4 -2.7 -2.7 -2.6 -2.5 
Government debtc 69.5 69.4 70.7 73.6 73.6 72.8 
Current account -0.2 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.8 
a Change as percentage of GDP.       
b As percentage of total labour force.       
c As a percentage of GDP.       
 
The forecast sluggish recovery will continue to be dominated by strong 
export growth but will become slightly more broad-based. A weak investment 
recovery appears to be underway, encouraged by low real interest rates. Private 
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consumption will experience modest growth supported by real personal 
disposable income growth.  Growth in government expenditure is likely to be 
more muted than in recent years, mainly due to the need in some of the Euro 
Area’s larger countries to rein in expenditure to comply with the rules of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. 
 
The forecast is based on the following assumptions: 
The oil price is projected to increase moderately this year and to decline over 
the course of next year. Average prices are forecast to be around $41 per barrel 
in 2005 and $39 per barrel in 2006. 
 
The exchange rate between the US-Dollar and the Euro is assumed to remain 
relatively stable over the forecast horizon at $1.31 ($/€) in 2005 and $1.32 
($/€) in 2006.  
 
The short-term interest rate in the Euro Area is projected to be 2.3 per cent at 
the end of 2005 and 2.7 at the end of 2006. 
 
The forecasts are based on data available up to 14th of March 2005.  
 
In 2004, core inflation in the Euro Area remained marginally above the 
ECB’s target of “close to but below 2.0 per cent” against a background of poor 
economic growth. The inflation outlook in the Euro Area remains relatively 
benign, as the currency appreciation continues to exert downward pressure on 
import prices and output remains below full capacity. Nonetheless, the recent 
rise in oil prices has made the possibility of a cut in interest rates unlikely in the 
immediate future. To date there has been an absence of second-round effects 
from developments in the oil market to wages and prices in the Euro Area.   
The forecast for inflation shows a downwards trend over the next two 
years. Average inflation, as measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP), is expected to be 1.9 per cent this year before decreasing to 1.7 
per cent in 2006. This fall in inflation is being triggered by weak output growth 
in early 2005, the feed-through of the stronger currency and continuing 
moderate wage increases. The tighter prevailing monetary conditions due to the 
strengthening of the euro coupled with the dampening effect on inflation of 
the current lull in growth mean the ECB are likely to keep interest rates 
unchanged in the first half of 2005. Thereafter monetary policy is expected to 
be tightened in order to bring rates more in line with a neutral rate implied by a 
Taylor rule.  
Fiscal balances in the Euro Area remain a contentious issue among Member 
States and our projections show some progress in fiscal consolidation over the 
short term horizon. The overall Euro Area deficit stood at -2.7 per cent in 
2004, unchanged from the previous year with France, Germany, Greece and 
Italy breaching the 3 per cent of GDP ceiling. The deficits for Germany, 
France and Greece are expected to be reduced both this year and next, 
although they will continue to remain outside the SGP deficit limits, while the 
Italian deficit is forecast to deteriorate further. Subdued growth prospects in 
Italy will contribute to an increase in its budget deficit this year before 
declining to 3.2 per cent of GDP in 2006. Although the economic situation 
may warrant it, the fiscal stance in the Euro Area does not appear to be 
expansionary. 
Euro Area unemployment averaged a stubbornly high rate of 8.9 per cent 
of the labour force in 2004. An unemployment rate of this magnitude is related 
to the accumulation of weak growth in the Euro Area over recent years, and 
the slower growth forecast for this year may cause the high unemployment rate 
to become further entrenched. Particularly high rates of unemployment of 
about 10 per cent prevail in the larger economies of Germany, France, Spain, 
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as well as in Greece. The impact of the recent merger of the welfare system 
and the unemployment system under the Hartz IV labour market reforms in 
Germany may move German unemployment rates higher initially, although 
they should result in the level of unemployment falling as active labour market 
interventions help boost employment over time. The standardised Euro Area 
unemployment rate is expected to reach 9.0 per cent this year before declining 
moderately to average 8.8 per cent in 2006. 
The current account surplus has remained small and is by no means the 
major counterpart to the large and increasing US deficit. This surplus is 
projected to increase slightly in 2005 and 2006 to 0.8 per cent of GDP, up 
from 0.6 per cent of GDP in 2004. This rise will be driven by strong export 
demand growth and relatively moderate import growth. 
EXTERNAL DEMAND AND GROWTH 
Economic activity in the Euro Area remains heavily dependent upon external 
conditions leaving it vulnerable to changes in global growth and exchange 
rates. However, despite the strengthening of the euro and a moderation in 
external demand, Euro Area exports grew at an impressive rate in 2004 in 
comparison to growth in previous years and growth is expected to hold up well 
over the short run.  Export price competitiveness, fostered through low rates 
of inflation and subdued unit labour costs, has permitted some Euro Area 
countries to maintain export market shares despite the rising euro. Intra 
European trade, notably with the fast growing economies of Eastern Europe, 
and trade exposure with oil exporting nations have also provided support to 
overall Euro Area exports. Looking ahead, slowing global trade and risks 
arising from a further strengthening of the euro will leave net trade in the Euro 
Area making a negative contribution to economic growth. Strong growth in 
import volumes continues to outpace gains made through exports and 
therefore not all countries will see a boost to their output.   
 
Chart 1.7: Non Euro Area exports, Total Euro Area exports and trade shares 
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As Chart 1.7 illustrates, external trade grew by 10.6 per cent in 2004 up 
from 5.9 per cent in the previous year, while growth in Euro Area exports 
increased by 5.6 per cent during this same period. This robust growth in 
exports is attributable to some Euro Area countries maintaining 
competitiveness and strong growth in global imports.  The high price of oil has 
facilitated strong import growth in oil exporting countries that have historically 
been quick to recycle their oil revenues. European exporters are increasingly 
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exposed to these countries and to other fast growing and emerging economies 
such as China, which registered over 20 per cent growth in import volumes in 
2004. Chart 1.7 also shows that the rise in Euro Area export growth coincides 
with a reduction in global trade share losses suffered by member country 
exporters. This trend began in 2003 and, although the Euro Area as a whole is 
expected to continue to suffer from trade share losses in the very near term, 
these losses will diminish over time as competitiveness gains achieved by 
individual countries, notably in Germany and France, move to sustain export 
market shares. These developments will support Euro Area exports in the near 
term despite a projected slowing of external trade growth.  
Chart 1.8:  Export Price Competitiveness 
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Low inflation amongst Euro Area countries and subdued cost push pressures 
in some of the major economies have helped to keep overall exports 
competitive despite the strength of the euro. A closer look at export price 
competitiveness in Chart 1.8 reveals that both Germany and France have 
remained substantially more competitive than either Italy or Spain.6 Relatively 
low inflation and subdued unit labour costs in Germany means that it has 
appreciated less in real effective terms than the rise in the euro might suggest. 
In Italy, however, rising unit labour costs have contributed to a loss in 
competitiveness and a recent deterioration in its trade balance. Remaining 
competitive externally does not necessarily imply a greater market share of 
exports. Falling labour costs and productivity gains in France have helped it to 
be more competitive externally, but this has not translated into a greater share 
of the export market, as Chart 1.9 indicates.7 Germany and Spain, however, 
have managed to maintain their respective market shares over the recent past, 
but the strength of the euro could impact on them in our forecast period.  As 
the Euro Area trade share indicates (see Chart 1.7), member countries are 
expected to stop losing export market shares and this is likely to be 
underpinned with low inflation and continued favourable financing costs. 
Moreover, the appreciation of the euro, while having the potential to weigh 
negatively on competitiveness, reduces the cost of commodities, such as oil, 
and manufacturing equipment, which are priced in US dollars, further easing 
costs to manufacturers. 
 
6 Export price competitiveness in a country is defined as the ratio of the price of non-
commodity exports of goods and services to the price of its competitor’s exports.    
7 A constant market share is defined as maintaining a constant share of imports into world 
markets.  
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Chart 1.9: Export market share 
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Recent gains in external price competitiveness do not appear to have come 
at the cost of thinning profit margins, which would point to increasing future 
export prices and the possibility of losses in export market shares. More 
precisely, corporate restructuring efforts, notably in Germany, and subdued 
wage pressures throughout most of the Euro Area have helped firms to build 
profit margins. Therefore, profits have grown but firms have not had to absorb 
much of the cost of the rise in the euro since competitiveness has, for the most 
part been maintained. Taken in conjunction with other national reform 
processes and the low cost of capital, the employment situation in the Euro 
Area is set to improve providing, a boost to consumption and total domestic 
demand.  
The impact of trade share gains achieved through competitiveness effects is 
expected to feed through to domestic absorption as consumption and 
investment gain traction in the near term.  This process will be supported by 
low financing costs, low inflation, and rising levels of tangible and financial 
wealth. Government expenditures will, however, remain restrained leaving only 
a modest pace of domestic expansion. However, the resulting combination of 
domestic and external demand will provide a more balanced path for economic 
growth in the near term.  
DOMESTIC DEMAND AND GROWTH: WHY IS THE EURO AREA 
GROWING SO SLOWLY? 
Part of the recent deficiency in domestic demand), and consumption in 
particular, can be attributed to the economic uncertainties generated by 
national reform processes, such as the Hartz IV reforms in Germany. It is 
likely that the ambitious nature of the Lisbon agenda, as well as external 
developments, have imparted a degree of uncertainty regarding the impact of 
these reforms on social systems as well as in relation to corporate sector 
restructuring. In turn, Euro Area savings rates are high and private 
consumption remains stagnant. This dynamic is most apparent in Germany 
where the implementation of the first part of the Hartz IV reforms and 
continued corporate restructuring have been accompanied by high savings 
rates and anaemic growth in consumption.  
Looking at Chart 1.10 it is clear that German consumption as a proportion 
of personal income has been falling for some time and this trend has only 
recently been reversed. Both French and Italian ratios appear to have oscillated 
around the same point, while in Spain consumption has fallen well below 
previous levels. Stronger consumption growth in the Euro Area needs the 
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support of rising employment growth. This will move to broaden the basis of 
economic growth and help to restore confidence as contributions from net 
trade begin to moderate.  
Chart 1.10: Real consumption to personal disposable income 
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Interest and exchange rate developments, at least in part, also explain the 
lacklustre performance of the Euro Area economy in recent times. Monetary 
policy has not been particularly restrictive, and real interest rates are low (see 
Chart 1.11). However at the same time, the exchange rate has been very strong 
with the Euro Area nominal effective exchange rate appreciating by 13.8 per 
cent in 2003 and a further 5.4 per cent increase in 2004. This has served to 
reduce the export market shares of the Euro Area economies and external 
demand.  
Chart 1.11: Real Interest Rates in the Euro Area 
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MAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE LARGER EURO AREA 
ECONOMIES  
Output growth differences between Euro Area countries have diminished in 
2004 and this trend is set to continue over the near term.8 Although growth 
differences have diminished, they have remained distinct and there are clear 
differences in the sources of growth. French and Spanish economic 
performance strengthened in the fourth quarter of 2004. GDP rose by 
approximately 0.8 per cent in both countries. This convergence of quarterly 
growth rates may mask the fact that the French and the Spanish economies 
have been following different paths in 2004. The strong growth in France 
followed an exceptionally weak third quarter. It does not constitute an 
acceleration of economic activity, but rather a return to the trend observed 
since the third quarter of 2003. Between that quarter and the first half of 2004, 
French output has been growing at an average quarterly rate of 0.8 per cent, 
which is very close to the growth rate posted in the fourth quarter. Spanish 
growth, on the contrary, has been accelerating steadily since the second quarter 
of 2003, from 0.6 percent in that quarter to 0.8 per cent in the fourth quarter 
of 2004. The Atocha bombing in March 2004 had a very strong impact on 
GDP growth, which decelerated from 0.8 per cent in the first quarter of 2004 
to 0.5 in the second quarter. However, exports of services were the only 
component of GDP affected by this event, and recovered quickly in the 
following quarters of the year. In contrast to the strengthening performance of 
the French and Spanish economies Germany's economy contracted by 0.2 
percent in the final quarter of last year with the negative impetus coming from 
company investment and consumer spending.  
 
Chart 1.12: The Contribution of the External Sector to Growth 
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The external sector should make a negative contribution to growth in the 
major Euro Area countries, with the notable exception of Germany (see Chart 
1.12). The appreciation of the euro hampered export performance and boosted 
imports. Although French and Spanish exports accelerated in the fourth 
quarter of 2004, export volumes in France and Spain have closed the year 2004 
3.2 and 4.5 per cent above the levels reached in 2003, respectively. Imports 
have increased by 7.4 per cent in France and 9 per cent in Spain. Preliminary 
data from the Italian central bank indicate that import volumes rose by 3.2 per 
 
8 Based on the standard deviation of unweighted growth rates of the Euro Area countries 
excluding Luxembourg. 
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cent in 2004, and Italian exports by 2.5 per cent.  Finally, as we show in Chart 
1.9 France, Italy and Spain have been losing export market. As a result, a 
positive contribution of the external sector in these three countries over the 
forecast horizon is very unlikely. German export volumes picked up markedly 
in 2004, rising at 7.5 per cent above their 2003 levels, in spite of suffering from 
the appreciation of the euro. German exporters have been particularly 
successful in the Chinese market and have benefited from strong import 
growth in that country. 
The development and deregulation of financial markets in Europe has 
eased the liquidity constraints faced by consumers enabling them to draw upon 
both private wealth and current income to smooth their spending decisions 
over time. Evidence increasingly points to a positive relation between housing 
wealth (or the real value of the housing stock) and private consumption (see 
Al-Eyd and Barrell (2004) for an investigation and evidence). Chart 1.13 below 
shows that the real price of housing in both France and Spain has increased 
substantially in recent times, while those of Germany and Italy have remained 
relatively flat. Strong house price growth has clearly supported consumption in 
France, and to a lesser extent in Spain, whilst weak house prices have held back 
consumption in Germany, but have had little impact in Italy. 
Chart 1.13: Real House Price Growth* 
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Looking at fiscal matters, in both France and Germany, government 
expenditure is expected to remain restrained by their respective governments’ 
commitment to achieving medium-term fiscal balance. Both countries have 
been in breach of the Maastricht treaty for three consecutive years and are now 
required to adjust public spending. The French government adopted stringent 
measures in the 2005 Budget to bring the budget deficit below 3 per cent of 
GDP. We thus anticipate annual government expenditure will grow at an 
average of 1.5 per cent over the forecast horizon. The budget deficit should 
revert to 3 per cent of GDP in 2005, and remain around this level in 2006. The 
reduction of the fiscal deficit to the Maastricht threshold in 2005 (from 3.7% 
to 3.1%) will be mainly due to the exceptional revenue generated by the 
transfer of management of EDF (Electricité de France) and GDF (Gaz de 
France) pensions to the state pension regime. The two state-owned firms will 
financially compensate the government with a transfer of €7.7 billion, 
representing 0.45 per cent of GDP. We do not forecast a substantial 
improvement in Germany’s fiscal position, although the budget deficit will be 
reduced from 3.7 per cent of GDP in 2004 to 3.5 per cent of GDP in 2005, 
with the help of a one-off measure amounting to 0.4 per cent of GDP, and to 
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3.3 per cent of GDP in 2006, with the help of a one-off measure amounting to 
0.2 per cent of GDP.  
The Italian budget deficit is expected to reach around 3.5 per cent in both 
years. In the past two years, the Italian government has been relying on one-off 
measures to keep its deficit within the confines of the Maastricht Treaty.  
RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES   
Oil price developments continue to be characterised by significant volatility 
and they remain a major downward risk to the forecast. For this reason, we 
consider the impact on output in the Euro Area of a permanent $5rise in the 
price of oil. This is not meant as a forecast but rather to highlight the Euro 
Area’s exposure to oil prices.  
The euro could strengthen further, undermining future Euro Area growth. 
Issues relating to global imbalances persist. The US current account deficit has 
risen to more than 5 per cent of GDP, an all-time record high, and may 
increase further over the next two years with possible harmful consequences 
for Euro Area growth. 
Box: Oil Markets and China: Impact for European Economies 
Since 2001, oil and other commodity prices have risen strongly and have 
displayed considerable volatility. In addition to supply problems, the main 
reasons for this have been strong energy–intensive growth in China as well the 
upturn in the rest of the world. In 2004 supply rose faster than demand, but 
inventory accumulation kept prices on an upward path. In 2005-6, oil markets 
will remain tight, although demand growth especially in China, will slow down 
from exceptionally high rates. The lack of free capacity continues to be the 
main problem making markets vulnerable in the long run as oil demand is 
expected to remain strong. 
With less than a 5 per cent share of global oil output, China does not 
produce enough oil to meet its own demand. In 2004, China surpassed Japan 
as the second largest petroleum consumer in the world after the USA. The 
strong rise in energy demand will continue. 
A sustained rise in oil demand from developing countries, and especially 
from China, will raise the equilibrium oil price permanently. Rising oil prices 
increases the costs of firms and reduces the purchasing power of consumers. 
The impact of a permanent $5 increase in the price of oil is to only slightly 
depress the Euro Area in the short term. The impact on the Euro Area will be 
less than for the USA because the Euro Area’s oil intensity of output is lower. 
In regions like the Euro Area where demand is not strong the impact of higher 
oil prices is the same as the terms of trade change against that region, reducing 
output and raising prices. 
 
Impact of a permanent $5 increase in the price of oil on GDP 
 Euro Area Germany France Italy USA 
per cent difference from base  
2005 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
2006 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 
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Chart 1.14:  World Oil Demand Growth 2000-2005, Estimated by IEA and 
Euroframe Oil Price Forecast 
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CONCLUSIONS  
The Euro Area is experiencing a temporary lull in growth caused, in part, by 
high and volatile oil prices and the strong appreciation of the effective 
exchange rate. However, weak growth in recent years has also been due to 
structural problems in Germany, which will take time to resolve. Our forecast 
for the Euro Area economy is that it will experience a modest rate of output 
growth in 2005 with a gradual pick-up in activity by the second half of the year 
and into 2006. Our forecast for output growth in real GDP terms is 1.5 per 
cent in 2005 followed by a rise to 2.0 per cent in 2006. Domestic demand is 
expected to make a stronger contribution to growth than in the recent past 
while the continued appreciation of the euro will result in a smaller 
contribution to growth from the external sector. The potential impact of 
increasing global imbalances, most noticeably the US current account deficit, 
remains a threat to Euro Area growth. It is difficult to see how the issue of the 
strong euro will be addressed without US policy changes. 
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Forecast Tables 
 
Annex Table 1: Real GDP in Major Economiesa 
 World OECD NAFTA EU-25
Euro 
Area USA Japan Germany France Italy UK
 Annual percentage changes 
2002 3.1 1.7 1.9 1.1 0.9 1.9 -0.3 0.1 1.1 0.4 1.8
2003 3.9 2.2 2.8 0.9 0.5 3.0 1.4 -0.1 0.5 0.4 2.2
2004 4.6 3.2 4.3 2.2 1.8 4.4 2.6 1.0 2.3 1.1 3.1
2005 4.5 2.7 3.6 2.0 1.5 3.6 0.8 0.8 2.1 1.0 2.8
2006 4.3 2.9 3.3 2.3 2.0 3.3 2.1 1.6 2.2 1.5 3.0
1995-
2001 3.6 2.9 3.4 2.6 2.4 3.4 1.2 1.7 2.6 2.0 3.0
a GDP data shown in the tables are adjusted for working-day variation. Extra working days in 2004 add 
around a quarter percentage point to GDP growth in 2004 for the Euro Area, while it reduces growth 
marginally in 2005. The impact of working-day variation is most pronounced for Germany. 
 
Annex Table 2: Private Consumption Deflator in Major Economies 
 OECD NAFTA EU-15 Euro Area USA Japan Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
2002 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.2 1.4 -1.2 1.2 1.7 3.1 1.6 
2003 1.9 2.3 2.0 2.0 1.9 -0.7 1.0 1.8 2.5 1.9 
2004 2.0 2.5 1.9 2.0 2.2 -0.5 1.6 1.5 2.1 1.3 
2005 2.3 3.2 1.9 1.9 2.8 0.3 1.6 1.9 2.0 1.7 
2006 2.6 3.4 1.9 1.7 3.3 0.7 1.0 1.9 2.2 2.5 
1995-
2001 3.0 3.3 2.1 2.2 1.9 -0.2 1.4 1.2 3.2 2.4 
 
Annex Table 3:  World Trade Volume and Prices 
 World trade volume 
World export prices 
in $ 
Oil price ($ 
per barrel)a 
 Annual percentage changes 
2002 3.6 0.5 24.4 
2003 4.8 9.4 27.8 
2004 9.0 7.9 35.9 
2005 7.3 5.4 41.4 
2006 5.0 4.2 38.6 
1995-2001 7.3 -1.5 19.3 
a Based on the unweighted average of the Brent, WTI (West Texas Intermediate) and Dubai oil 
prices. 
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Annex Table 4: Interest Rates 
 Short-term interest rates  Long-term interest rates  
 USA Japan 
Euro 
Area UK USA Japan Euro Area UK 
2002 1.7 0.1 3.3 4.0 4.6 1.2 4.9 4.9 
2003 1.2 0.0 2.3 3.7 4.0 1.1 4.2 4.5 
2004 1.6 0.0 2.1 4.6 4.3 1.5 4.2 4.9 
2005 3.3 0.1 2.3 4.9 4.3 1.5 4.2 4.9 
2006 4.1 0.3 2.7 5.0 4.6 1.8 4.3 5.0 
2007 4.4 0.5 3.2 5.0 4.7 2.0 4.5 5.0 
         
2004Q1 1.0 0.0 2.1 4.1 4.0 1.4 4.2 4.8 
2004Q2 1.3 0.0 2.1 4.5 4.6 1.8 4.4 5.1 
2004Q3 1.7 0.0 2.1 4.8 4.3 1.4 4.2 5.0 
2004Q4 2.3 0.0 2.2 4.8 4.2 1.4 3.8 4.7 
         
2005Q1 2.7 0.0 2.1 4.8 4.2 1.5 3.9 4.7 
2005Q2 3.2 0.0 2.2 4.9 4.3 1.5 4.0 4.8 
2005Q3 3.5 0.1 2.3 5.0 4.4 1.5 4.1 4.9 
2005Q4 3.7 0.2 2.4 5.0 4.4 1.6 4.1 5.0
         
2006Q1 3.9 0.2 2.5 5.0 4.5 1.6 4.2 5.0 
2006Q2 4.0 0.3 2.7 5.0 4.5 1.7 4.3 5.0 
2006Q3 4.1 0.3 2.8 5.0 4.6 1.8 4.3 5.0 
2006Q4 4.3 0.4 2.9 5.0 4.6 1.9 4.4 5.0 
 
Annex Table 5a: Effective Exchange Rates 
 USA Japan Euro Area Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
2002 3.0 -0.4 7.5 2.9 3.4 4.8 2.5 
2003 -6.0 3.9 13.8 6.6 6.4 7.1 -2.7 
2004 -4.7 4.2 5.4 2.3 2.3 2.7 5.3 
2005 -3.7 1.7 2.1 0.7 1.2 1.1 -1.0 
2006 -0.1 2.9 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 -1.5 
2004Q1 -1.9 0.4 3.4 1.5 1.3 1.7 4.6 
2004Q2 2.2 -1.7 -2.7 -1.4 -1.3 -1.4 0.4 
2004Q3 -0.8 0.0 1.1 0.4 0.5 0.5 -0.1 
2004Q4 -3.7 2.0 3.1 1.3 1.6 1.6 -1.6 
2005Q1 -1.0 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 
2005Q2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
2005Q3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 
2005Q4 0.0 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.6 
2006Q1 0.0 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.5 
2006Q2 0.0 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.4 
2006Q3 0.0 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.4 
2006Q4 0.0 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
22 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO AREA 
Annex Table 5b:Bilateral Exchange Rates    
 Yen Euro Sterling 
 Bilateral rate per US Dollar 
2002 125.2 1.063 0.667 
2003 115.9 0.886 0.612 
2004 108.2 0.805 0.546 
2005 103.9 0.765 0.531 
2006 100.9 0.758 0.535 
2004Q1 107.2 0.800 0.544 
2004Q2 109.8 0.831 0.554 
2004Q3 109.9 0.818 0.550 
2004Q4 105.8 0.773 0.536 
2005Q1 104.1 0.766 0.531 
2005Q2 104.1 0.766 0.53 
2005Q3 104.1 0.766 0.529 
2005Q4 103.3 0.763 0.532 
2006Q1 102.3 0.761 0.534 
2006Q2 101.4 0.759 0.535 
2006Q3 100.5 0.757 0.536 
2006Q4 99.5 0.754 0.537 
 
Annex Table 6: Euro Area, Main Features of Forecasta 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 Annual percentage changes 
Volumes   
Consumption 1.9 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.5 
Private investment -0.4 -3.4 -1.0 1.3 2.7 3.1 
Government expenditure 2.3 2.8 1.5 1.7 1.2 1.4 
Stockbuildingb -0.6 -0.1 0.4 0.5 0.1 -0.1 
Total domestic demand 1.0 0.3 1.2 1.8 1.6 1.7 
Export volumes 3.5 1.9 0.2 5.6 5.7 4.9 
Import volumes 1.8 0.5 2.0 5.9 6.1 4.3 
GDP 1.6 0.9 0.5 1.8 1.5 2.0 
Average earnings 3.6 3.3 2.8 2.9 2.0 2.3 
Harmonised consumer prices 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 
Private consumption deflator 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.7 
Real personal disposable income 2.6 1.2 0.9 1.6 1.6 1.3 
 Levels 
Standardised unemploymentc  8.0 8.4 8.9 8.9 9.0 8.8 
Government financial balanced -1.7 - 2.4 -2.7 -2.7 -2.6 -2.5 
Government debtd 69.5 69.4 70.7 73.6 73.6 72.8 
Current accountd - 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.8 
a See footnote a of Annex table 1. 
b Change as percentage of GDP.  
c As percentage of total labour force.  
d As a percentage of GDP.  
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Annex Table 7: Real GDP in the European Uniona 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 Annual percentage changes 
Austria 1.4 0.7 2.1 2.3 2.3 
Belgium 0.9 1.3 2.7 2.2 2.3 
Denmark 1.0 0.4 2.0 2.7 2.6 
Finland 2.2 2.5 3.4 2.9 3.1 
France 1.1 0.5 2.3 2.1 2.2 
Germany 0.1 -0.1 1.0 0.8 1.6 
Greece 3.9 4.3 4.8 3.0 3.2 
Ireland 6.1 3.6 4.3 5.4 5.4 
Italy 0.4 0.4 1.1 1.0 1.5 
Netherlands 0.6 -0.9 1.3 1.0 2.3 
Portugal 0.4 -1.2 0.8 1.8 2.3 
Spain 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.3 
Sweden 2.0 1.6 3.4 3.1 2.6 
United Kingdom 1.8 2.2 3.1 2.8 3.0 
Euro Area 0.9 0.5 1.8 1.5 2.0 
EU-15 1.0 0.8 2.0 1.8 2.2 
Accession-10 2.4 3.7 5.0 4.2 4.3 
EU-25 1.1 0.9 2.2 2.0 2.3 
a GDP data shown in the tables are adjusted for working-day variation. Extra working days in 
2004 add around a quarter percentage point to GDP growth in 2004  for the Euro 
Area, while it reduces growth marginally in 2005. The impact of working-day variation 
is most pronounced for Germany. 
 
Annex Table 8: Inflation in the European Union 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 Annual percentage changes 
Austria 1.7 1.3 2.0 2.1 1.8 
Belgium 1.6 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.0 
Denmark 2.4 2.0 1.0 1.7 2.1 
Finland 2.0 1.3 0.2 1.3 1.5 
France 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.0 1.9 
Germany 1.3 1.1 1.7 1.5 1.0 
Greece 3.9 3.4 3.0 3.6 2.9 
Ireland 4.7 4.0 2.3 1.5 2.3 
Italy 2.6 2.8 2.3 2.1 2.2 
Netherlands 3.8 2.2 1.4 1.1 1.3 
Portugal 3.7 3.3 2.5 2.2 2.5 
Spain 3.6 3.1 3.1 3.0 2.3 
Sweden 2.0 2.3 1.0 1.9 2.1 
United Kingdom 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.7 2.2 
Euro Area 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 
EU-15 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 
Accession-10 2.7 1.9 4.1 3.0 2.8 
EU-25 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.0 1.9 
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Annex Table 9: Fiscal Balances in the European Union 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 % GDP 
Austria -0.2 -1.0 -1.0 -1.7 -1.8 
Belgium 0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 
Denmark 1.6 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.1 
Finland 4.3 2.1 2.4 2.2 2.3 
France -3.3 -4.1 -3.7 -3.1 -3.0 
Germany -3.7 -3.8 -3.7 -3.5 -3.3 
Greece -3.7 -4.6 -5.0 -4.2 -3.3 
Ireland -0.2 0.2 0.5 0.0 -0.7 
Italy -2.4 -2.5 -2.9 -3.5 -3.6 
Netherlands -1.9 -3.2 -2.6 -2.1 -1.9 
Portugal -2.7 -2.8 -2.6 -2.7 -2.0 
Spain -0.1 0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.5 
Sweden -0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 
United Kingdom -1.6 -3.3 -3.0 -3.6 -4.0 
 
Euro Area -2.4 -2.7 -2.7 -2.6 -2.5 
 
Annex Table 10: Standardised Unemployment Rate in the EU-15 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 % Total labour force 
Austria 4.1 4.3 4.5 4.9 5.1 
Belgium 7.3 7.9 7.8 7.3 7.7 
Denmark 4.6 5.5 5.4 4.9 5.1 
Finland 9.1 9.0 8.9 8.8 8.6 
France 8.9 9.4 9.6 10.0 9.6 
Germany 8.7 9.6 9.8 10.1 9.7 
Greece 10.3 9.7 10.1 9.9 9.7 
Ireland 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.6 4.5 
Italy 8.6 8.4 7.8 7.6 7.9 
Netherlands 2.8 3.8 4.6 5.0 5.2 
Portugal 5.0 6.3 6.6 6.9 6.4 
Spain 11.3 11.3 10.8 10.3 10.4 
Sweden 4.9 5.6 6.3 7.2 7.5 
United Kingdom 5.2 5.0 4.7 4.6 4.5 
Euro Area 8.4 8.9 8.9 9.0 8.8 
 
 
 
 2. EUROPEAN POLICY 
MONITORING 
Monetary policy has been quite accommodative in the recent past. Since 
June 2003, the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing operations of the 
Eurosystem has been 2.0 percent. Money market rates (3-month EURIBOR) 
were only slightly higher in early March this year. Apparently, markets expect 
that interest rates will not be raised very soon. If nominal rates are adjusted for 
core inflation, the real short-term interest rate is close to zero, i.e. well below 
the long-term average of 2 to 2 ½ percent for the Euro Area. Long-term rates 
are extremely low as well. The yields for 10-year government bonds have come 
down by some 50 basis points since the spring of last year and were near the 
historical lows they had previously reached in early 1999 and early 2003. In 
part, the decline reflects the expectation of a moderation of economic growth 
in the Euro Area and elsewhere as this has been a general tendency on world 
bond markets. In real terms, long-term interest rates are also very low by 
historical standards, whether the adjustment is made with the current rate of 
core inflation (total HICP excluding energy and unprocessed food) or the 
measure of inflationary expectations which is commonly approximated by the 
ten-year break-even inflation rate for the Euro Area; this measure has stayed 
slightly above 2 percent for more than a year now. Credit growth has 
accelerated in the wake of the economic recovery, and also the growth rates of 
monetary aggregates, which play a role in the monetary policy strategy of the 
ECB, picked up in the course of 2004. All these indicators suggest that 
monetary conditions in the Euro Area are favourable and stimulate economic 
activity.  
2.1  
Monetary Policy 
in the Euro Area 
The only major dampening factor stems from the exchange rate. The euro 
has gained ground against major world currencies, in particular against the US-
dollar. However, the rapid appreciation of the euro, which could be observed 
up to the end of 2004, did not continue in the first months of this year. All in 
all, the euro has appreciated against the US currency by roughly 5 percent in 
the past 12 months. At the same time, the appreciation in real effective terms 
amounted to only 2 percent; this implies that the competitiveness has not been 
strongly affected and that the impact of the recent exchange rate change on real 
GDP growth and inflation in the Euro Area will be quite limited. It has to be 
kept in mind, however, that this appreciation comes on top of the previous 
sharp rise amounting to some 20 percent in real effective terms between late 
2001 and early 2004.  
Monetary policy is clearly on a course that is broadly supportive of the 
economic recovery at the Euro Area level. Key interest rates are low also if 
they are compared to the Taylor rule which may be used as a gauge of the 
monetary policy stance. If calculations of this rule are based on the standard 
formula1, current interest rates in the Euro Area are lower than their “neutral 
 
 
1 In the original version, the coefficients for the reaction to both the inflation gap and the 
output gap are 0.5. Following this assumption and assuming further that the core rate of 
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level” according to the rule, the difference being about 100 basis points. This is 
due to the fact that currently, (core) inflation is somewhat higher than the 
target of the ECB and that the negative output gap is – according to our 
estimate – relatively small, amounting to about -0.5 percent in 2004.2  
This judgement is also important for the future course of monetary policy. 
The neutral nominal interest rate, which would be appropriate if overall 
capacity utilization in the economy is normal and if inflation is at the target, is 
probably between 3.5 and 4 percent.3 Such an estimate would follow from the 
Taylor rule and other rules for monetary policy. With the recovery continuing, 
the ECB is likely to move in that direction, which is also appropriate given its 
mandate to maintain price stability. 
Against this background, further reductions of key rates are unlikely. Also, 
it has to be remembered that the ECB has reduced interest rates to the current 
low levels because of previous negative shocks and unusual uncertainties 
concerning the economic outlook. For example, about two years ago, the risk 
of deflation was publicly discussed not only in the United States but also in the 
Euro Area. But these risks are much less relevant today. Although the recovery 
in the Euro Area has so far been relatively sluggish, it has firmed enough so 
that it would not be credible to state that the unusual circumstances, which led 
to very low interest rates, persist. In other words, the economy does not need a 
further stimulus from monetary policy under the present and foreseeable 
circumstances. 
However, the timing of interest rate hikes is also crucial and should depend 
on the outlook for inflation. Given our forecast, we do not see that the neutral 
rate should be targeted at in the near future. As far as demand conditions are 
concerned, we expect that the recovery will continue at a moderate pace. In 
addition, inflation will probably not accelerate so that interest rates do not have 
to be raised very quickly. In our view, rates will be raised moderately later this 
year and in 2006 so that short-term interest rates should be 2.9 percent at the 
end of 2006.  
When evaluating the future monetary policy, it has to be kept in mind that 
there appears to be ample liquidity not only in the Euro Area but also 
worldwide. The ECB has acknowledged this on various occasions.4 This is not 
only revealed in rapid growth of monetary aggregates in major economies but 
also in bond yields which are historically low in real terms; the latter fact is 
especially surprising given the strength of the upswing in the world economy. 
Also against this background, the ECB has repeatedly warned of “upside risks 
for price stability”. While our central forecast does not imply that the high level 
of liquidity will translate into a surge of nominal demand and therefore pose a 
major inflationary risk, a central bank with a commitment towards low inflation 
 
inflation is a better guide for policy than the “headline” rate, the rule for period t can be 
interpreted as follows:  
(1) i = r + π + 0.5 (π – π*) + 0.5 (y – y*), with i being the nominal interest rate, r the equilibrium 
real interest rate, π the (core) rate of inflation, π* the inflation target, y actual real GDP, and y* 
potential real GDP. 
2 The calculations also require an estimate for the so-called equilibrium real interest rate. This is 
far from trivial. In general, estimates for the Euro Area are between close to 2 per cent, which is 
roughly in line with estimates for the growth rate of potential output. As it is well known, 
estimates vary here, too, and consequently the estimates for the output gap are affected as well. 
But according to most estimates – including that of our model - of the output gap and the 
equilibrium real interest rate, the current money market rate is lower than the one following 
from a Taylor rule. 
3 i.e. the sum of the real equilibrium interest rate (about 2 percent) and the target for inflation 
(slightly less than 2 percent). Needless, to say, such calculations of equilibrium real interest rates 
are highly uncertain. The modern literature on macroeconomics suggests also that this rate may 
fluctuate even in the short run. 
4 “... there remains significantly more liquidity in the euro area than is required to finance non-
inflationary growth.” European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, January 2005: 5.  
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has to closely monitor such developments of liquidity as well. Currently, we do 
not see that such a risk is emerging as the growth rate of nominal GDP is 
rather low. A scenario in which the ECB may have to consider an opposite 
move of interest rates concerns a possible sharp appreciation of the euro. 
(Such a scenario was considered in Chapter 1 and is discussed in detail in an 
Appendix to this report.) In order to prevent a strong deterioration of 
monetary conditions, the ECB would most likely lower key interest rates. 
 
 This section provides a brief assessment of the short-term budgetary 
prospects in the euro area. It focuses on the fiscal stance expected in the euro 
area in comparison with the latest updates of the stability programmes (SP) 
released at the end of 2004. It addresses successively: GDP growth scenarios, 
deficits targets and the fiscal stance of the euro area and summaries of two 
views of EUROFRAME-EFN institutes views on the agreement reached on 
the Stability and Growth Pact by the European Council of 22nd to 23rd March 
2005. 
2.2 
Fiscal Policy in 
the Euro Area 
GROWTH PROSPECTS   
The EUROFRAME-EFN Spring 2005 forecast expects the euro area GDP to 
grow by 1.5 per cent this year and 2.0 in 2006, well below the figures forecast 
in the SPs where euro area GDP is expected to grow by 2.3 per cent this year 
and 2.4 next (see Table 2.1). The SPs may well turn out again to be optimistic 
at the euro area level, as has been the case each year since 2001; in other words 
since the economic slowdown began in 2000.  
Over our forecast horizon, we expect GDP to grow less rapidly than 
announced in the SPs, mainly in Germany this year (0.8 as compared to 1.75 in 
the SP, with growth expected to come closer to the SP figure next year: 1.6 as 
compared to 1.75), in Italy (around 1.0 this year and 1.5 next year instead of 
25), and Greece (around 3 instead of more than 46). We expect French GDP 
to grow slightly less rapidly than in the SP (around 2.1 in 2005 and 2006 
instead of 2.5 per cent). The macroeconomic scenarios of the SPs are judged 
broadly realistic for the other euro area countries.  
DEFICIT TARGETS  
We do not expect the deficit targets announced in the SPs to be met in 2005 
and 2006 at the euro area level (EUROFRAME-EFN forecast of around 2.6 
per cent each year instead of the 2.3 per cent and 1.8 per cent announced in the 
SP). The deficit targets announced in the SPs are not expected be met in 2005 
in the three biggest countries: France, Germany and Italy. But the other euro 
area countries will probably meet their deficit targets. The same is likely to 
occur also in 2006.  
The targets announced by Germany, France and Italy will not be met, partly 
because the assumptions on economic growth are too optimistic - GDP 
growth is expected to remain weak especially in Germany and Italy - partly 
because contractionary measures will not be as strong as announced. One-off 
measures are expected to cut the deficit by around 0.5  per cent of GDP in 
each of the three countries in 2005 and by 0.2  per cent of GDP in Germany in 
2006. Additional restrictive measures would be needed for the three countries 
to meet their targets. In particular, Italy has to phase-out the one-off measures 
used extensively in recent years and to replace them with more structural 
measures. But at the same time the Italian government faces two important 
 
5 The Italian government has already announced it will revise downwards its forecasts for 2005. 
6 Figures available in early March, before the submission by the Greek government of a revised 
SP update due for March 21. 
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elections, which may make it unrealistic that additional measures will be 
implemented to tighten the fiscal stance.  
The forecasts for GDP growth and fiscal balances suggest that the three 
biggest countries will be able to bring their deficits below 3 per cent of GDP in 
2005 and 2006 only if they implement more restrictive fiscal policies than 
announced, unless they decide to use creative accounting again.  
 
Table 2.1. Euro area GDP growth and general government balances according to the stability 
programmes 
GDP growth assumptions (per cent) General government balance (per cent of GDP) 
Stability Programmes Stability Programmes 
J99 J00 J01 J02 J03 J04 J05 
Actual 
J99 J00 J01 J02 J03 J04 J05 
Actual
98 2.8       2.9 -2.1 -1.9   -2.3 
99 2.5 2.2      2.8 -1.7 -1.4 -1.2   -1.3 
00 2.6 2.8 3.3     3.5 -1.5 -1.1 -0.7 -0.8   -1.0 
01 2.6 2.5 3.1 1.7 1.5   1.6 -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -1.2 -1.6  -1.7 
02  2.5 2.9 1.9 1.0   0.9 -0.6 -0.3 -0.9 -2.2  -2.4 
03  2.5 2.8 2.6 2.1 0.6  0.5 -0.2 0.0 -0.5 -1.8 -2.7 -2.8 
04   2.8 2.6 2.6 1.9 2.0 1.8 0.4 0.1 -1.1 -2.4 -2.7 -2.7 
05    2.6 2.6 2.5 2.3 1.51 0.3 -0.6 -1.8 -2.3 -2.61
06     2.6 2.5 2.4 2.01 -0.2 -1.3 -1.8 -2.51
07      2.5 2.4 -  -0.9 -1.3 - 
08       2.4 -   -1.0 - 
1. EUROFRAME-EFN, Spring Forecast 2005. 
Sources: EUROFRAME-EFN, Stability programmes, Eurostat, own calculations. 
EXPECTED FISCAL STANCE 
We expect euro area GDP to grow by 1.5 per cent and government deficits to 
remain almost unchanged this year at around 2.6 per cent of GDP. Deficits 
excluding one-off measures will, however, be close to 3 per cent this year like 
last year (with one-off measures expected to amount to 0.35 per cent of GDP 
in 2005 after 0.2 in 2004). On this basis, the fiscal stance in the euro area will 
be slightly restrictive this year. If it were assumed that potential output grows 
by almost 2.2 per cent, as in the SPs, the fiscal stance would appear to be 
marginally less restrictive this year at the euro area level (see Table 2.2b) than 
announced in the SP’s (see Table 2.2a). However, the uncertainties in 
estimating the output gap and how potential output growth impacts on the 
fiscal stance are well known. Hence the fiscal stance would be more restrictive 
under higher potential growth estimates and would be better characterised as 
neutral with potential output growing at around 1.6 per cent. 
In 2006, we expect GDP growth to accelerate at around 2.0 per cent and 
deficits to decrease to around 2.5 per cent of GDP, i.e. 2.6 excluding with one-
off measures. This implies a restrictive fiscal stance of around -0.4 per cent of 
GDP against -0.7 per cent in the SPs.  
Up to 2006, the fiscal stance is expected to be neutral or restrictive in 
almost all euro area countries according to the SP, with some exceptions: 
Belgium, Finland and Austria. Fiscal policy will probably have a dampening 
effect on economic growth at the euro area level in 2005 and 2006.  
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Table 2.2a. GDP growth, fiscal balances and fiscal impulses in the updates of 
the stability programmes, end 2004 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Real GDP growth, per cent 
Germany – 0.1 1.8 1.7 1.75 2.0 2.0 
France 0.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Italy 0.3 1.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 
Spain 2.5 2.6 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 
The Netherlands -0.9 1.25 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5* 
Belgium 1.3 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.0 
Austria 0.8 1.9 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 
Finland 2.0 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.2 2.0 
Portugal -1.2 1.0 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.8* 
Greece 4.5 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.2* 
Ireland 3.7 5.3 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.4* 
Luxembourg 2.9 4.4 3.8 3.3 4.3 4.3* 
Euro area 0.6 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 
General government balance, per cent of GDP 
Germany -3.8 -3.75 -2.9 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 
France -4.1 -3.6 -2.9 -2.2 -1.6 -0.9 
Italy -2.4 -2.9 -2.7 -2.0 -1.4 -0.9 
Spain 0.4 -0.8 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 
The Netherlands -3.2 -3.0 -2.6 -2.1 -1.9 -1.9* 
Belgium 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.6 
Austria -1.1 -1.3 -1.9 -1.7 -0.8 0.0 
Finland 2.1 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.0 
Portugal -2.8 -2.9 -2.8 -2.5 -1.8 -1.4* 
Greece -4.6 -5.3 -2.8 -2.6 -2.5 -1.9* 
Ireland 0.1 0.9 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6* 
Luxemburg 0.8 -1.4 -1.0 -0.9 -1.0 -1.0* 
Euro area -2.7 -2.7 -2.3 -1.8 -1.3 -0.9 
Fiscal impulse, per cent of GDP (1) 
Germany  -0.8 0.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 
France 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -1.1 -0.6 -0.6 
Italy 0.3 -0.6 -0.4 -1.2 -0.4 0.0 
Spain -0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.1 
The Netherlands -0.2 -0.7 -0.8 -0.4 -0.1 0.1* 
Belgium 0.4 1.2 0.6 0.5 -0.3 -0.4 
Austria 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.1 -0.8 -0.7 
Finland 1.9 0.6 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.2 
Portugal -0.2 -0.9 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.2* 
Greece 1.9 1.1 -2.2 -0.4 0.3 -0.2* 
Ireland -1.9 -0.8 0.3 -0.3 0.3 0.1* 
Luxemburg 1.3 2.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.2 0.0* 
Euro area -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.7 -0.4 -0.3 
 
(1) Excluding one-off measures, as estimated by EUROFRAME-EFN (see Table 2b). The fiscal 
impulse is the opposite of the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, as estimated 
by the SP and excluding one-off measures.  
*Own assumptions. 
Sources: Stability programmes, Sixth updates, end 2004, own assumptions. 
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Table 2.2b. GDP growth, fiscal balances in the EUROFRAME-EFN forecast and 
fiscal impulses  
 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Real GDP growth, per cent 
Germany -0.1 1.0 0.8 1.6 
France 0.5 2.3 2.1 2.2 
Italy 0.4 1.1 1.0 1.5 
Spain 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.3 
The Netherlands -0.9 1.3 1.0 2.3 
Belgium 1.3 2.7 2.2 2.3 
Austria 0.7 2.1 2.3 2.3 
Finland 2.5 3.4 2.9 3.0 
Portugal -1.2 0.8 1.8 2.3 
Greece 4.3 4.8 3.0 3.2 
Ireland 3.6 4.3 5.4 5.4 
Euro area-10 (1) 0.5 1.8 1.5 2.0 
General government balance, per cent of GDP 
Germany -3.8 -3.7 -3.5 -3.3 
France -4.2 -3.7 -3.1 -3.0 
Italy -2.9 -3.0 -3.5 -3.6 
Spain 0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 
The Netherlands -3.2 -2.6 -2.1 -1.9 
Belgium 0.4 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 
Austria -1.0 -1.0 -1.7 -1.8 
Finland 2.5 2.1 2.0 2.0 
Portugal -2.9 -2.9 -2.7 -2.0 
Greece -5.2 -6.1 -4.2 -3.3 
Ireland 0.2 1.3 0.0 -0.7 
Euro area-10  -2.8 -2.7 -2.6 -2.5 
One-off measures, per cent of GDP 
Germany 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.2 
France 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 
Italy 2.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 
Spain 0.0 -0.8 0.0 0.0 
The Netherlands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Belgium 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Austria 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Finland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Portugal 2.5 2.0 1.4 0.7 
Greece 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ireland 0.0 0.5 -0.4 -0.2 
Euro area-10  0.4 0.2 0.3 0.1 
Fiscal impulse, per cent of GDP (2) 
Germany  -0.8 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 
France 0.1 -0.4 -0.2 -0.6 
Italy 0.6 -1.1 -0.3 -0.8 
Spain -0.5 -0.4 0.6 0.1 
The Netherlands -0.2 -1.0 -1.1 -0.2 
Belgium -0.1 1.4 0.3 0.8 
Austria 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.3 
Finland 1.8 1.0 0.3 0.4 
Portugal -0.1 -1.1 -0.9 -1.2 
Greece 1.9 1.3 -1.0 -1.5 
Ireland -2.1 -0.8 -0.7 0.7 
Euro area-10 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 
(1) Excluding Luxembourg. (2) Excluding one-off measures. Fiscal impulse is the opposite of 
the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, derived from EUROFRAME-EFN 
Spring forecasts for GDP growth, fiscal balances and one-off measures, with potential 
output growth as in the stability programmes. 
Sources: EUROFRAME-EFN Spring forecast Stability programmes, sixth updates, end 2004, 
Eurostat, own assumptions. 
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IMPROVING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STABILITY AND 
GROWTH PACT7 
The Ecofin Council of 20th March 2005 reached an agreement on the 
implementation of the Pact and that agreement was endorsed by the European 
Council of 22 March. The agreement on increased flexibility has been seen by 
most observers as a victory for the countries currently breaching the rules 
(Germany, France and Italy). Some observers, like the ECB, see the agreement 
as threatening euro area stability, while others welcome it as a step towards a 
Pact based more on economic logic. 
The Council reaffirms that the reference values of 3 per cent of GDP for 
the deficit ratio and 60 per cent for the debt ratio continue to be the 
centrepiece of multilateral surveillance, but also states that the economic 
rationale of the budgetary rules must be enhanced and that heterogeneity must 
be taken in consideration in a European Union of 25 countries. 
THE AGREEMENT  
The agreement has three parts.  
 
Part 1, ‘Improving governance’, lists a set of responsibilities: the 
Commission and the Council respect ‘Member States’ responsibility to 
implement the policies of their choice within the limits set by the Treaty’; the 
Commission is the guardian of the Treaty; the Council exercises its margin of 
discretion; the Member States, the Council and the Commission implement the 
Treaty and the Pact. Item 1.3 addresses the issue of complementary European 
and domestic fiscal rules, and, without precision, inadequacies between the 
concept of public deficit in national accounts and the objectives of mutual 
surveillance. Item 1.4. invites new elected governments to show continuity with 
the budgetary targets of the former government. Item 1.7. stresses the need for 
reliable statistics.  
Part 2, ‘Strengthening the preventive arm’, aims to define medium term 
objectives (MTO) for borrowing differentiated for each Member State: they 
will vary from -1 per cent of GDP for low debt/high potential growth 
countries to achieving balance or surplus for high debt/low potential growth 
countries. The implicit liabilities from ageing populations will be estimated and 
taken into account. The MTO will be reviewed every four year. Member States 
should make a fiscal effort of 0.5 per cent of GDP per year (in cyclically and 
one-offs adjusted terms) until they reach their MTO. The effort should be 
higher in positive output gap periods, smaller in bad times. Member States 
could deviate from this trajectory by explaining the reasons for it in their 
stability programmes. Structural reforms (in particular pension reforms 
introducing a mandatory, fully funded pillar) will be taken into account if they 
raise potential growth and induce long-term savings. The Commission will 
have the right to send early warnings.  
Part 3 is entitled ‘Improving of the excessive deficit procedure’. The 
Commission will always prepare a report if the deficit exceeds 3 per cent. A 
limited and temporary excess over the reference value will be allowed if it 
results from a negative growth rate or a strong negative output gap. The 
Commission report will take account of ‘all other relevant factors’: policies 
implemented in the framework of the Lisbon agenda, R&D expenditures, 
public investments, economic situation, debt sustainability. Member States will 
be able to put forward other factors such as budgetary efforts for international 
solidarity or for European goals or for the unification of Europe. The cost of 
the introduction of a compulsory, fully funded pillar for pensions would also 
 
7 ‘Improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact’, Council report to the 
European Council, 7423/05, 21 March 2005.  
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be taken in account. If an excessive deficit occurred in year n it would have to 
be corrected in year n+2 (n+3 in some specific cases), the effort having to be 
at least 0.5 per cent of GDP per year. 
The agreement brings the crisis that erupted at the Council of 25th 
November 2003 to an end, but it will probably have no impact on current fiscal 
policies in euro area countries. The agreement does not introduce fiscal policy 
coordination targeting growth. At the same time, it allows the countries that 
have breached the 3 per cent limit (like France, Germany and probably Italy) to 
give reasons for the breach and it will thus possibly allow these countries not to 
take strong corrective measures. The easing of the medium-term objective will 
also have a very limited impact, since that objective was not really taken into 
account in the fiscal policies of most Members States.   
VIEWS OF EUROFRAME-EFN INSTITUTES 
The summaries of two views of EUROFRAME-EFN institutes on the 
agreement reached on the Stability and Growth Pact by the Council of 22-23 
March 2005 are given below. The views can be found in Appendix 1. 
According to Joachim Scheide, Klaus-Jurgen Gern (IfW), Malgorzata 
Markiewicz (CASE) and Wim Suyker (CPB), the statement that the reference 
values of the SGP – a 3 per cent deficit ratio and a 60 per cent debt ratio – 
remain unchanged is welcome But, there are now several modifications which 
raise doubts whether “… the need to reduce government debt to below 60  per 
cent of GDP at a satisfactory pace …” (Council Report: 16) can be met in 
reality. The risk that budget deficits will be higher and that fiscal policy will 
become less sustainable in the future has increased.  The target of a balanced 
budget can only be achieved if the structural budget deficits are reduced 
considerably every year in a pre-announced way, and that this course should 
not be made dependent on the state of the business cycle. The budgets should 
be balanced in the near future according to the rules of the SGP. Budget 
deficits above 3  per cent in relation to GDP should automatically be qualified 
as excessive ;  no “other relevant factors” should be considered. The failure of 
the SGP to produce the desired sound fiscal policy was not due to wrong 
targets but rather due to the fact that several governments have not pursued a 
strict course of budget consolidation. 
According to Ulrich Fritsche, Alfred Steinherr (DIW), Catherine Mathieu, 
Henri Sterdyniak (OFCE), Markus Marterbauer, Ewald Walterskirchen 
(WIFO), the lessons of the past have not been fully drawn.  The reform still 
lacks economic rationale: there is no reflection on the objective of fiscal policy 
or on the measurement of the output gap; the softening of the MTO is too 
limited; the 3 per cent of GDP threshold for deficits, the medium run balance 
objective, the requested annual 0.5 per cent decrease in structural deficits to 
GDP ratios remain.  No reduction in the structural deficit should be required 
in bad time. Fiscal policies in Europe must be implemented at three levels. 
Each Member State must keep the responsibility of its fiscal policy. European 
authorities should intervene only to prevent the emergence of negative 
externalities (excessive inflation, too large current account deficit, unsustainable 
public debt). Economic co-operation would be useful within the Eurogroup 
with the ECB agreeing to dialogue; it should not focus on public finance 
criteria, but should target the 3 per cent economic growth of the Lisbon 
strategy.  
 
 In March 2000 the EU-15 leaders made a commitment to a series of reforms 
and goals that collectively became known as the Lisbon Agenda. The explicit 
aim of this programme was to make the European Union the most dynamic 
and competitive economy in the world by 2010. Unlike the Single European 
Market programme, which had an intellectual basis in the Cecchini Report, and 
2.3  
Progress on the 
Lisbon Agenda 
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the creation of a monetary union, which relied on the One Market One Money 
report, the Lisbon Agenda was launched without a coherent intellectual basis. 
However, in 2004, the Sapir Report set out the economic logic behind the 
Agenda.  
In order to achieve its aims, the Lisbon Agenda set out a number of targets 
that should be met by 2010. In November 2004, Wim Kok, the former prime 
minister of the Netherlands, presented a report to the European Council 
reviewing the progress made on the aims of the Agenda thus far. Kok cited 
external events since 2000 as the main contributor to the lack of progress 
made, as well as a lack of urgency on behalf of the Member States in adopting 
the proposals. He suggested that the Lisbon Agenda lacked specificity in that 
while it outlined desirable aims, it neglected to highlight the means of achieving 
them. Kok concluded that the Agenda was not overambitious and that the 
2010 target date should remain. 
José Manuel Barroso, the new president of the European Commission, 
announced a new strategy to revitalise the Agenda in February of this year. The 
new revitalised plan proposes an updating of the Lisbon Agenda, with the main 
focus now on delivering sustainable growth and better jobs. Success in these 
two key areas will enable achievement of other economic goals such as 
progress on social and environmental issues. It involves a streamlining of the 
original proposals, with an outlining of clearer objectives across ten key policy 
areas.8 
However, the recent European Council ended without any significant 
additional commitment by governments to furthering the Lisbon Agenda. As 
many of the spheres in which progress is needed are properly the remit of 
national governments it is not clear that there is going to be any greater 
urgency shown to the underperformance in this area of policy. 
In the light of the revised Strategy, we now consider a few significant 
examples of recent policy innovations that have either contributed to or have 
detracted from the objectives encapsulated in the Lisbon Agenda. The issues 
on the macro-economic policy framework are dealt with elsewhere in this 
report. Here we focus on progress in four key policy areas: 
THE LABOUR MARKET 
The Sapir Report, among many others, has highlighted the need for labour 
market reform in the EU. Such reforms are seen as vital if the EU is to raise its 
employment rate and if the waste of resources represented by unemployment is 
to be effectively tackled. However, this area of policy is generally the remit of 
national governments. Each Member State has different labour market 
institutions and, as a result, very different policy measures may be needed in 
each State.  
Over the period between 1999 and 2003, beginning from a low base, the 
biggest improvement in the employment rate occurred in Spain and Italy 
(Table 2.3). These two countries also saw a significant fall in long-term 
unemployment. Even though the employment rate was already high in Sweden 
and the Netherlands, these two countries also saw some increase over the same 
period. 
Over the last year a number of policy innovations have been established in 
major EU Member States. In the case of Germany the Hartz IV reforms 
should have some impact on the German labour market over the coming years 
(Boss and Elendner, 2005). While initially the numbers registered as 
unemployed have risen as a result of the reforms, this is due to the way such 
administrative data are collected. The effect of the reforms should be to 
 
8 The key policy areas highlighted cover the internal market, competition, regulation, 
infrastructure, research and development, ICT, the European industrial base, employment, 
labour markets, and educational attainment 
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encourage more of those currently unemployed to seek employment. The 
attractiveness of paid employment relative to unemployment benefit payments 
will increase marginally. This is because the level and the eligibility criteria of 
unemployment benefits payable unconditionally to the long-term unemployed, 
has been tightened and the duration of short-term pay related unemployment 
benefits will be gradually reduced starting from next year. Therefore, over time, 
the reforms should, in combination with improvements in the administrative 
procedures in the labour office, help reduce the numbers unemployed using a 
standardised measure (the ILO definition of unemployment). 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
As shown in Table 2.3, a number of the new Member States score significantly 
better than the average for the EU 15 in the area of the educational attainment 
of those aged 20 to 24 years(Kok, 2004). In the case of the EU 15 there is 
evidence of a significant increase in investment in human capital over the 
period between 1999 and 2003, especially in Portugal, Belgium, Ireland and 
Italy. 
Looking over a much longer time frame, Figure 3.1 measures investment in 
human capital for a selection of EU states. It shows the ratio of the human 
capital index for 25-29 year olds relative to that for 55-59 year olds. An 
increase in the ratio indicates an upgrading in the human capital of the 
population over a 30-year period.9 The Figure suggests major improvements in 
some countries, including Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland. However, a 
number of these countries were coming from a very low base and the level of 
human capital in Portugal, for example, still remains significantly below the EU 
average. 
 
Figure 2.1: Investment in Human Capital 
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The Sapir report points to the problems faced by unskilled labour in the EU 
economy, with very high unemployment rates. While measures are certainly 
needed to enhance employability and the demand for unskilled labour, 
consideration also needs to be given to reducing the supply, through raising 
retention rates in the educational system. While a long-term project, such a 
programme of investing in the human capital of those who would otherwise 
remain unskilled could produce a high long-term economic and social pay-off 
for the EU. 
 
9 The human capital indices are derived by weighting the returns (in terms of wage rates) to 
different levels of education by the numbers in those educational categories. Four levels of 
education are used: third level; those who have completed upper secondary; those who have 
completed lower secondary; and those with no qualifications.  
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RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) 
In Table 2.3 we show the performance of EU Members States on some key 
indicators, two of which relate to R&D. Sweden and Finland already devote a 
significant share of national output to research and development. Sweden in 
particular has further increased its national allocation of resources to R&D 
over the period 1999-2003. A number of other smaller EU States, such as 
Belgium and Denmark have also increased resources on R&D. In the case of 
the 10 accession states, the share of resources allocated to R&D is well below 
the EU 15 average, with Slovenia and the Czech Republic being the leaders. 
However, an allocation of funds to R&D does not guarantee that they will be 
used productively and there is much less evidence on the efficacy of the 
expenditure across the EU. 
In 2005, some countries like Italy or France are in the process of 
introducing or raising fiscal incentives for firms undertaking R&D. The French 
budget contains a number of measures designed to improve the attractiveness 
of some French areas (‘competitiveness poles’). The idea is to give fiscal 
incentives to companies investing in high technology production in specific 
geographic areas. These “poles” must bring about collaborative work between 
Universities or training centres, public or private research centres, and small 
and big firms, to introduce innovative production processes. France has 
created a new ‘Agence pour la recherche’ to fund applied research conducted 
by private or public centres. Italy has undertaken similar measures. 
Looking to the future it will not be sufficient just to raise expenditure on 
R&D. Attention will need to be given to how increased resources can be best 
used. The shortfall in investment in R&D is not just a problem for EU 
governments. A significant part of the problem lies with underinvestment by 
firms. It will be important for the EU as a whole to learn from the models in 
some member states that are already working, encouraging increased links 
between firms and the broader research community. 
COMPETITIVENESS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
The signing of the Kyoto protocol was a major achievement for the EU. The 
single most important instrument so far implemented to limit emissions is the 
Emissions Trading Scheme that came into effect in January 2005. This scheme 
has the potential to ensure that the necessary reduction in emissions is achieved 
at least cost to the EU economy. However, the details of its implementation 
over the period 2005-2007 mean that it will be unnecessarily damaging to the 
competitiveness of the EU, while also being less effective than it should be in 
limiting emissions.10 
Over the coming year, in reviewing how this scheme will operate between 
2008-2012 governments should reconsider their approach. A move to increase 
the share of permits that are auctioned in the period 2008-2012 offers the best 
opportunity to remove the distortions in the present scheme. The revenue 
from the auctions would permit governments to reduce taxes elsewhere in their 
economies. Such a reform would reduce the overall cost to the EU economy of 
complying with the Kyoto protocol, resulting in improved competitiveness and 
an increase in sustainable employment. 
 
 
 
10 The reasons for this are twofold: Firstly, the lack of an emissions permit auction system will 
increase the cost of emissions trading (Goulder et al., 1999, Congressional Budget Office, 2000). 
Secondly, the second round allocation of free permits for the 2008-2012 period means that 
many of the bigger polluting firms that are covered by the scheme and have market power (e.g. 
electricity generation) are incentivised to remain in business to receive a further free allocation of 
permits for the next round, further raising the costs of compliance with Kyoto for the EU (Fitz 
Gerald, 2004). 
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Table 2.3: Change in Performance of Member States on Structural Indicators, 
1999-2003 
 Employment 
Rate % 
Long-term 
Unemployment 
Rate % 
R&D 
Expenditure, % 
of GDP 
Educational 
Attainment (20-
24) % 
Austria 0.2 (69.2) 0.0 (1.1) 0.07 (2.2) -0.2 (83.8) 
Belgium 0.1 (59.6) -0.3 (3.7) 0.11 (2.2) 1.3 (81.3) 
Germany -0.1 (65.0) 0.1 (4.6) 0.02 (2.5) -0.5 (72.5) 
Denmark -0.2 (75.1) 0.0 (1.1) 0.14 (2.5) 0.3 (74.4) 
Spain 1.5 (59.7) -0.5 (3.9) 0.05 (1.0) -0.4 (63.4) 
Finland 0.3 (67.7) -0.2 (2.3) 0.05 (3.4) -0.4 (85.2) 
France 0.6 (63.2) -0.2 (3.5) 0.00 (2.2) 0.2 (80.9) 
Greece 0.6 (57.8) -0.3 (5.1) -0.02 (0.6) 0.6 (81.7) 
Ireland 0.5 (65.4) -0.2 (1.5) -0.02 (1.2) 0.9 (85.7) 
Italy 0.9 (56.1) -0.5 (4.9) 0.04 (1.1) 0.9 (69.9) 
Luxembourg 0.3 (62.7) 0.1 (0.9) - -0.4 (69.8) 
Netherlands 0.4 (73.5) -0.1 (1.0) -0.07 (1.9) 0.3 (73.3) 
Portugal -0.1 (67.2) 0.1 (2.2) 0.05 (0.9) 1.9 (47.7) 
Sweden 0.3 (72.9) -0.2 (1.0) 0.31 (4.3) -0.2 (85.6) 
UK 0.2 (71.8) -0.2 (1.1) 0.01 (1.9) 0.7 (78.2) 
EU-25 0.3 (62.9) 0.0 (4.0) 0.03 (1.9) 0.5 (76.7) 
EU-15 0.5 (64.4) -0.2 (3.3) 0.02 (2.0) 0.3 (73.8) 
US -0.7 (71.2) - 0.03 (2.8) - 
Note: The levels of the indicators of the EU 15 in 2003 are given in parenthesis 
Source: Kok, 2004. 
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3. WHEN JOBS DISAPPEAR 
AND WORKERS DO NOT… 
INTERNATIONAL 
RELOCATION OF 
PRODUCTION AND THE 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY 
‘By damming up a source of supply of some commodity, we may increase the 
employment available for workers in a particular occupation, but we cannot 
directly increase the employment available for workers as a whole.’ One may 
guess this is a quote from an economist. One is not likely to guess, however 
that this quote is nearly a century old. The concern that jobs disappear abroad 
(and do not reappear) is not characteristic for our time, but seems for all time. 
Pigou (1913) wrote a book on unemployment for the general public in which 
he explained that the worries about international trade, the plea for shorter 
working hours and the anxiety about prison-labour were based on the same 
idea: the amount of work is fixed. The anxiety about prison-labour is outdated 
and pleas for shorter working hours are nowadays far from popular, but the 
worries about international trade are still common.  
3.1 
Introduction 
Worries about outsourcing and relocation of economic activities seem of all 
time, and of all places. On both sides of the Atlantic politicians address these 
worries among the general public. In the last election campaign the Democratic 
presidential candidate, John Kerry, criticised companies which relocated 
production abroad. He also criticised the Bush administration for not doing 
enough to stem the loss of American jobs to other countries. To counter this, 
he proposed changes to US corporate taxes. Even so the Republican President 
George W. Bush was hardly a staunch advocate of free trade. During his first 
administration, tariffs were introduced to protect the US steel industry from 
foreign competition.  
The interest in outsourcing is not confined to America but is also alive in 
Europe. Recently, the German engineering firm Siemens has been able to 
secure an extension of the working week at the same rates of pay by 
threatening to shift production to Hungary. Also, the French branch of the 
German manufacturer Bosch has used the threat of relocation to persuade 
workers to put in more hours without extra pay. The response of European 
leaders has strong similarities with that of American politicians. The German 
chancellor Schröder labelled offshoring unpatriotic. The French Prime Minister 
Raffarin announced "competitiveness zones" in which companies would be 
offered reduced corporate tax rates and social charges in exchange for 
39 
40 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO AREA  
commitments not to take jobs overseas (See Mathieu and Sterdyniak (2005) for 
an overview of the French debate). 
The concern about relocation is of all time and of all places but the cause 
for such concern seems now greater than in the past. The impact of relocation 
is growing: over time, trade and investment flows have increased much more 
rapidly than production. This is part of the internationalisation process. 
Different economies are becoming more intertwined because barriers to 
foreign trade and investment are disappearing (to some extent at least). One of 
the consequences is that the country of origin is difficult to determine for some 
products. The World Trade Organisation (WTO, 1998) gives the example of a 
car sold by one of the major US car manufacturers. At least nine countries are 
involved in the production of this car. Only 37 per cent of its value can be 
attributed to activities in the United States. The rest of its value is linked to 
activities in South Korea (30 per cent), Japan (17.5 per cent), Germany (7.5 per 
cent), Singapore (4 per cent) and Taiwan (4 per cent), among others.  
These days, the international division of labour is no longer restricted to 
manufacturing industry, but also extends to services. The breakthroughs in 
communication technologies have made some services tradable, since 
producers and consumers no longer need to be in the same place. This applies 
in particular to administrative services (e.g. payroll administration or 
transaction processing), call centres and some IT services (e.g. development 
and testing of computer programs). According to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2004), 12 per cent of all 
cross-border investment projects concern these types of services. This is 
attracting attention because a proportion of the tradable services has moved to 
Asia and Central and Eastern Europe, and because these services require 
skilled workers.  
In the economic literature the possibility that a country loses from 
relocation is extensively studied (a recent example is Samuelson, 2004), but 
many economists expect the gains to exceed the losses. The chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisers Gregory Mankiw saw in the relocation of 
production ‘just a new way to international trade’ and called it ‘a good thing’. 
For that assessment he was lambasted by both Democrats and Republicans. 
One can conclude from this that the economists’ message of free trade, and of 
the relocation of activities as part of its application, does not convince 
everyone. One reason for this is that the disadvantages of relocation are clearly 
visible, while the advantages are difficult to observe directly.1 When a company 
transfers activities abroad, this sometimes leads to immediate job losses. This 
disadvantage is clearly visible. It is not included in the story that the redundant 
workers subsequently find other jobs at other companies. What is more, the 
advantage of relocation either becomes evident only later, when the company 
reports higher profits, or does not become evident at all, when the profits fall 
to the company’s various customers in the form of lower prices.  
The aim of this chapter is to supplement the debate about the direct effects 
of relocation with a clear exposition of the indirect effects. Therefore, it not 
only presents the arguments pro and contra relocation, but also reviews empirical 
evidence on the extent of relocation and the impact of relocation on the 
economy of the country of origin. In that way it assesses who may gain and 
who may loose from relocation. In addition, it analyses the implications for 
policy by asking two questions. First, if relocation leads to policy competition, 
what could be done about that? Second, how can public policy enhance the 
gains from relocation and soften the impact on those who loose. 
 
1 Kets and Tang (2004) offer several other reasons why the benefits of free trade as advocated 
by economists do not always convince non-economists. For a start, the dynamic benefits of 
liberalisation are highly uncertain. 
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Definitions 
A number of terms are used in the context of relocation, such as ‘offshoring’, 
‘outsourcing’, ‘foreign direct investment’ etc. This can lead to some confusion. 
To avoid this in this chapter, Table 3.1 gives the various terms a place. It 
distinguishes between two dimensions of economic activities: geographic 
location and legal ownership. The term ‘offshoring’ refers to relocation of 
activities across the geographical border, whereas outsourcing refers to 
relocation across the firm’s boundaries (widely used comparable terms have 
been put in parentheses).  
Not much attention is given in this chapter to the dimension of ownership, 
despite a recent literature in which ownership, productivity and relocation are 
linked. Successful companies − those with popular products or low production 
costs – exploit this success by entering foreign markets. The most successful 
companies do this by relocating activities and setting up plants outside their 
own country. Indeed, according to Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) in the 
United States exporting companies are 39 per cent more productive than 
domestically oriented companies, and multinational concerns 54 per cent more 
so. One reason to ignore the dimension of ownership is the limitation of space. 
The other, more important reason is that the dimension of geography is central 
to the commotion about relocation.  
Table 3.1: Relocation of Activities According to Geographic and Judicial 
Boundaries 
 Within a country 
 
Between countries 
Between firms  Outsourcing 
(National Outsourcing) 
Outsourced offshoring 
(International Outsourcing) 
 
Within a firm Insourcing  
(Domestic Investment) 
 
Inhouse offshoring  
(Foreign Direct investment) 
 
Section 3.2 discusses the reasons why companies may outsource or relocate 
activities abroad. Section 3.3 attempts to indicate the extent of relocation. 
Section 3. 4 examines the consequences for the economy as a whole as well as 
for certain groups within the economy. Section 3.5 considers arguments for 
government intervention and Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
 More than in the past, companies may choose where they locate parts of the 
production process. They relocate activities to countries with low wages, low 
environmental standards and/or flexible working conditions. They also 
relocate activities to countries where the state of economic development is 
comparable to Europe. Indeed, Europe itself attracts activities and thus 
benefits considerably from inward relocation. 
3.2 
Outsourcing: 
why, where? 
Companies have different motivations for relocating to ‘dissimilar and 
‘similar’ countries. In the case of relocation to a ‘dissimilar’ country, wage costs 
are likely to be the dominant factor. This motivation plays a role in the 
production of toys in China, for instance, but also in programming work in 
India. But other differences, such as in tax regimes and environmental 
standards, also play a role. Foreign trade and investment thus puts companies 
in a position to exploit cost differences between countries.  
In the case of relocation to a ‘similar’ country, the presence of key suppliers, 
customers or workers is decisive. For example, the US market is attractive to 
many companies because of its size, now and in the future. Furthermore, the 
easier access of knowledge workers to the European labour market or a larger 
supply of science students may help to keep certain knowledge-intensive 
activities in Europe. The key issue here is market access.  
  
42 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO AREA  
In practice, both motivations for foreign trade and investment, cost 
differences and market access, play a role in companies’ decisions to relocate. 
But internationalisation will shift the relative significance of both motivations.  
3.2.1  RELOCATION TO EXPLOIT COST DIFFERENCES  
There are cost differences between countries. These differences may stem from 
natural conditions (fertile land, rivers, ports), but also from the availability of 
productive factors (labour versus capital, low-skilled versus high-skilled 
labour). Government policies, as reflected in environmental standards for 
instance, may also play a role. These cost differences are exploited through 
international trade and investment. The aim is to sell one good at a high price 
(export) and to buy another good at a low price (import). The result is 
international specialisation.2 A country exports one good in which it has a 
comparative cost advantage, and imports another for which the production 
costs are relatively high. What this boils down to is that the country outsources 
some of the possible economic activities and concentrates on others.  
Competition, where the gain for one is a loss for the other, does not 
adequately characterise the commercial relations between countries. 
International specialisation is not a zero-sum game. Instead, it brings benefits in 
total, so that each participant may gain.  
Nevertheless, concerns remain. Some are concerned that the European 
economy cannot ‘compete’ with low-wage countries. Others have the concern 
that part of the European economy will disappear: they fear deindustrialization. 
Let us address these two related concerns briefly. 
Can Europe compete? 
As workers produce more, they can be paid more. The relationship between 
pay rates and labour productivity is therefore important. If these are in balance, 
then unit labour costs in, say, Germany and China will be the same, so that cost 
will not be a reason for a shift in demand for German or Chinese products. At 
the same time, the levels of wages and productivity can diverge sharply 
between the two countries. Or to put it differently, high productivity permits 
high wages. 
Productivity and wages do not always move in tandem. Let us assume that 
productivity growth unexpectedly lags behind wage increases over a certain 
period. This means that unit labour costs will rise, so that companies will 
become less competitive in domestic and foreign markets. Lower sales mean 
less demand for labour and rising unemployment. This drives down the wage 
level, until it rises again in line with the productivity level and unemployment 
has returned to its structural rate.  
The structural unemployment rate is strongly related to the institutional 
characteristics of the labour market: the level and duration of unemployment 
benefit, the tax wedge between gross labour costs and net wage income, and so 
on. However, in combination with domestic institutions, foreign competition 
can lead to structurally higher unemployment. Firstly, international 
specialisation puts the position of low-skilled workers under pressure. Through 
foreign trade and investment low-skilled workers in Europe compete with low-
skilled workers elsewhere. Secondly, relocation means additional job 
destruction and job creation, which may lead in the short run to ‘frictional 
unemployment’ (i.e. between-jobs unemployment). This will be examined in 
more detail and more specifically in Section 3.4.2. 
 
2 The notion that cost differences determine the international patterns of foreign trade and 
investment has a long history in economics. Its main protagonists are Ricardo, Heckscher, Ohlin 
and Samuelson. 
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Does trade with low-wage countries lead to deindustrialisation? 
Over the years, employment in manufacturing industry has declined in relative 
terms in industrial countries. The combination of globalisation and fast growth 
in low-wage countries leads to falling relative prices for (certain) manufacturing 
goods. In other words, increasing competition from low-wage countries forces 
industrial producers in Europe to outsource or even to close down. Low-wage 
countries will concentrate especially on simple production processes requiring 
much manual labour.  
However, domestic developments also bring about deindustrialization. 
Relatively high productivity growth in industry − in line with Baumol’s law − 
leads to falling relative prices of manufacturing goods and induces a sectoral 
restructuring towards services. Similarly, with higher income the demand for 
services becomes relatively higher. Indeed, rich countries are spending ever 
more on tourism and health care, for instance. This contributes to the 
reduction in industrial employment as well.  
Whether external or internal developments are more important for 
deindustrialization is an empirical matter.3 Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1999) 
estimate an equation for the share of manufacturing in output and 
employment. They find that ‘North-South trade explains less than one-fifth of 
the deindustrialization in the advanced economies’ in the period 1963-1994. 
The share in total employment has fallen but labour productivity has increased, 
with the result that the share in output has been roughly stable.  
3.2.2.  RELOCATION TO GAIN MARKET ACCESS 
Trade and investment flows do not arise from cost differences alone. 
Production is often located near important customers and/or close to main 
suppliers. Indeed, a firm may want to ‘conquer a market’ or may consider 
establishing ties with local producers. Access to output and input markets is 
one of the most important factors behind location decisions. It is a crucial 
determinant of trade and investment patterns. 
The analysis of market access as a factor of location starts with a tension 
between trade costs and scale economies. Trade costs include transport costs, 
import duties, communication problems between people with different 
languages and cultural backgrounds, differences in legislation etc. Scale 
economies are lower unit labour costs at higher output levels. These 
advantages arise, for instance, by spreading fixed costs such as overheads 
across a larger turnover. There is a trade-off between the two variables. When 
production is being spread, companies miss out on scale economies, while 
concentration of production pushes up trade costs. This tension can be 
overcome in part by choosing a location in proximity to a large market.  
Not all companies will opt for the same location. At an attractive location, 
competition on the local market will eventually be fierce and/or wages will 
eventually reach high levels. Consequently new companies will choose a 
different location, or existing companies will look for another location. 
Production of comparable goods and services will thus spread to different 
locations, within a country and across countries. This explains the intensive 
trade between countries of the same size and with the same productivity level. 
But a firm does not have to opt for a single location from which to supply 
both the home market and export markets. There is also a choice between 
 
3  International trade may magnify the consequences of domestic developments. Not all sectors 
will be able to improve their production process or renew their products sufficiently to keep up 
with average labour productivity growth. These sectors can only compete on the labour market 
and pay the going wage rate if the prices of their products rise. Manufacturing sectors with 
lagging labour productivity growth, however, face international competition and cannot afford 
higher prices. Production in those sectors will become structurally loss-making and will 
disappear over time, making room for more productive activities. 
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export and local production. By opening plants close to suppliers and buyers, 
companies can circumvent the trade costs.4 The higher these costs, the greater 
the incentive to produce locally. This argument is particularly relevant for some 
services, which cannot be relocated across distances and require physical 
proximity of producers and consumers (such as bank branches and accounting 
firms, but also cleaning work). Foreign direct investment between similar 
countries thus has a character of its own. It is not vertical, where companies 
slice up the value chain and spread it geographically, but horizontal, because 
they duplicate parts of the production process in different locations. The 
probability of horizontal foreign direct investment is greater when countries do 
not differ that much in sectoral labour productivity and in size (see Markusen, 
2002).5  
3.2.3  HORIZONTAL VERSUS VERTICAL SPECIALISATION  
Two broadly defined motivations inform location choices by companies and 
are behind patterns of international specialisation. Firstly, international trade 
and investment exploit cost differences between countries. These cost 
differences may arise from differences in the availability of productive factors, 
but also from differences in natural conditions. They lead to vertical 
specialisation, in which the various links in the production chain end up in 
different locations. Trade costs, broadly defined, are an obstacle to the 
exploitation of cost differences. Secondly, access to markets explains trade and 
investment patterns. Thus companies want to be near major customers and 
suppliers, or be close to specialised workers. The latter argument is relevant for 
R&D activities, for instance. This leads to horizontal specialisation, in which 
the same links in the production chain are found in different locations. Trade 
costs pose an obstacle to the trade in similar products. Local production is a 
means of avoiding some of these trade costs, however, since scale 
diseconomies may arise, this is not always profitable.6
The above motivations are not mutually exclusive.7 For example, 
investment in China is informed not only by the relatively low wages in that 
country, but also by the growth expectations for the Chinese market. Table 3.2 
shows the advantages and disadvantages for both forms of international 
specialisation. 
Table 3.2 Considerations with regard to vertical and horizontal specialisation 
 Vertical specialisation Horizontal specialisation 
Advantages Lower production costs Better market access 
Disadvantages Higher trade costs Scale diseconomies 
 
 
4 Here the focus is on product markets. A similar argument applies to labour markets. A 
company can opt to conduct its R&D activities at a central location and recruit foreign workers, 
or it can opt for several locations. The costs of migration are a factor in this choice. 
5 Markusen (2002) shows that, in addition to high trade costs and a plant’s low fixed costs, the 
fixed costs at company level are decisive for horizontal investment. A parent company provides 
services for subsidiaries. In many cases these services are associated with knowledge capital (e.g. 
expertise in production technologies, a brand name, a marketing strategy), which has the 
character of a public good within the company. In those cases scale economies arise at company 
level. As the scale economies at company level become more important in relation to the scale 
economies of a production unit, the opening of several plants will become more attractive. 
6 Markusen and Venables (2005) extend the notions of horizontal and vertical specialisation in 
the literature on FDI to international trade. 
7 Helpman and Krugman (1985) were the first to integrate the ‘new’ and the traditional trade 
theory. 
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Globalisation: more vertical and less horizontal specialisation? 
Trade costs have opposite effects on vertical and horizontal investment. A fall 
in trade costs makes it easier for companies to supply various markets from a 
particular base. In that way, it reduces the need for horizontal investment. But 
a fall in trade costs also enhances the opportunities for companies to exploit 
cost differences between countries, leading to more vertical investment. One 
may conclude from this that globalisation should trigger a shift in investment 
flows, away from flows between rich countries and towards flows between rich 
and poor countries. This is certainly true to some extent. Yet, more than half of 
the foreign direct investment by the European Union remain within the Union. 
More spectacular was the overall expansion of investment flows in the 1990s 
(see Section 3.3). These additional investments broadly followed the old 
pattern, that is, they were made in other rich countries. 
There are various reasons why the share of horizontal investment is not 
falling. Firstly, integration is often not so much global as it is regional. The 
deepening of the European Union (through the harmonisation or mutual 
recognition of standards, for instance) will stimulate investment flows within 
Europe. Secondly, lower trade costs constitute only one aspect of globalisation. 
Globalisation may also reduce institutional differences between countries, 
which is likely to stimulate horizontal investment. 
 
 With globalisation the cross-border flows of goods, services and capital are 
expanding faster than their production. The stock of direct investment by and 
in the four largest European countries − France, Germany, Italy and the United 
Kingdom − has on average more than trebled in the period 1989-2001. Export 
and imports have not kept pace with foreign direct investment but have 
nevertheless grown at a fast rate. They have roughly doubled in that period. 
From these numbers it is clear that relocation must have increased.  
3.3  
Relocation: facts 
and figures 
Table 3.3:  Foreign direct Investment of the four largest EU member states,a 
1989-2001 
 1989-1995 1996-2001  1989-1995 1996-2001 
 By home-companies  By foreign companies 
 in other countries  in home countries 
  % of total   % of total 
European Union 15 46.3 48.8 45.7 54.6 
United States 27.1 27.0 30.1 27.9 
Eastern Europe 0.4 1.8 0.1 0.1 
ASEAN countries (Japan not included) 3.6 3.5 0.6 0.6 
             China 0.1 0.5 - - 
             India 0.2 0.2 - - 
             Singapore and Hongkong 2.2 1.9 0.2 0.3 
Rest of the world 22.7 18.9 23.5 16.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
EUR billions 623.4 2367.5 457.3 1498.0 
Source: OECD (2005), adapted by CPB. 
a) France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.  No table could be derived for foreign 
direct investment from and to the EU-15 as a whole, since not every country reports. 
 - : Negligible amount 
3.3.1 GEOGRAPHICAL PATTERNS 
Even though the popular perception is that jobs disappear in developed 
economies to China and India, trade and investment flows go predominantly to 
and from the rich countries. Table 3.3 shows the stock of direct investment for 
the four largest European countries according to destination (outward) and 
origin (inward). Table 3.3 shows that the majority of the outward investment is 
made in the EU-15 (48.8 per cent in the period 1996-2001) and in the United 
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States (27.0 per cent). The flow of investment to Asian low-wage countries is 
modest and their share in the total is rising only slightly. China’s share is 
growing more quickly, at the expense of Hong Kong and Singapore.  
Eastern Europe’s share is larger than China’s and is rising even more 
rapidly. Especially nearby Germany has invested at a large scale in the new 
member states of the European Union. Its stock of outward investment has 
quadrupled in the period 1989-2001, and the share of capital in Eastern Europe 
has also quadrupled. The presence of Italian firms has sharply increased in the 
last ten years, but this does not show up in FDI statistics. These firms in 
traditional manufacturing are often small and medium sized and choose for 
‘light relocation’, i.e. choose for keeping parts of the production process at 
arm’s length.  
Table 3.4: EU-15 goods exports and imports, 1995-2003, average annual 
percentage growth and percentage share of the totala
 
Exports 
average 
growth share share 
Imports 
average 
growth share share 
 1995-2003 1995 2003 1995-2003 1995 2003 
EU-15 5.4 62.3 59.7 5.1 61.8 57.0 
United States 9.9 6.6 8.9 4.7 7.4 6.6 
Eastern Europe 13.1 2.9 4.9 14.9 2.6 4.8 
Asia (excl Japan) 5.3 10.2 9.7 10.2 9.5 12.8 
        China 13.2 1.0 1.6 18.9 1.7 4.2 
        India  5.1 0.6 0.6 7.0 0.5 0.6 
Rest of the world 5.2 18.0 16.9 6.3 18.7 18.8 
Total 6.0 100.0 100.0 6.2 100.0 100.0 
EUR billions  1542 2457  1469 2376 
a Source: ITC/WTO database 
 
Overall, the investment figures show that relocation to low-wage or accession 
countries does not occur on a large scale. Table 3.4 presents trade flows from 
and to the European Union of 15, and a familiar pattern arises. Intra-EU trade 
is more than half of the total. Also, the trade shares of Eastern Europe and 
China are rising fast, but are still modest. Over a longer time span this is also 
illustrated by Figure 3.1 and 3.2 for EU-15 manufacturing.8   
The fact that the origins and destinations of direct investment follow similar 
patterns is also remarkable. Investment in one country is balanced by a 
proportionately similar amount of investment from that country. For instance, 
nearly a quarter of all foreign direct investment by the four EU countries goes 
to the United States while US companies account for around a quarter of the 
direct investment in these four countries. Also import and export shares are 
strongly alike: the ranking of exporters and importers is broadly similar. 
Comparing Tables 3.3 and 3.4 makes clear that the geographic patterns for 
trade and investment are broadly similar. Whereas at the firm level investment 
may substitute for trade, the similarity in patterns suggests that at national level 
trade and investment go hand in hand. Indeed, Barrel and Dees (2005), for 
example, conclude that for various OECD countries imports and inward FDI 
are strongly, positively related. Furthermore, Holland and Pomerantz (2005) 
find for four accession countries the empirical result that inward FDI not only 
affects imports but also has a positive impact on exports.  
 
 
 
 
8 Over the same horizon Daudin and Levasseur (2005) show the substantial increase in French 
trade with emerging countries over 1967-2002. Yet, at the end of the period trade with these 
countries does not exceed 2.5 per cent of GDP. 
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Figure 3.1: Manufactured Exports to Emerging Industrial Countries ( per cent 
of EU-15 GDP) 
 
Figure 3.2: Manufactured Imports from Emerging Industrial Countries (as  per 
cent of EU-15 GDP) 
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The data on trade and investment patterns make clear that the flows among 
the rich countries are dominant. The flows to and from developing and 
transition countries grow, sometimes fast, but are only small fractions of the 
total. The data do not support the popular notions that distance is dead and 
that relocation towards low-wage or accession countries occur at a large scale.  
The upshot is that through international trade and investment European 
workers compete more with each other than with workers in low-wage 
countries. Also within Europe, geographical distance and economic size matter. 
The results from empirical work underline this. Using German firm-level data, 
Buch et al. (2005) show that as distance increases the average size of affiliates 
increases but the number of foreign affiliates declines. Blomstrom et al. (1997) 
find from firm-level data that workers of Swedish multinationals and their 
counterparts in low-wage countries do not compete directly. A study by 
Konings and Murphy (2001) into labour demand by multinationals comes to an 
analogous conclusion. They find statistically relevant substitution between 
plants in the European Union and not between plants in ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
Europe. Becker et al. (2005) find instead for German and Swedish 
multinationals a statistically significant result: a wage decrease of one per cent 
in Central and Eastern Europe has a negative effect on employment in 
  
48 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO AREA  
Germany and Sweden. This effect is statistically significant but is roughly one-
third of the effect on employment that results from a similar wage decrease in 
Western Europe.  
Trade and investment statistics may not give an entirely accurate picture of 
relocation. For example, investment in China may arise from the wish to serve 
the Chinese market, and have little or no consequences for activities in Europe. 
The other way around, locally financed foreign expansion does not appear in 
the statistics on FDI but may come at the expense of European exports.  
Surveys among firms are a different source of information. They have their 
own problems but complement trade and investment statistics. An Italian 
survey finds that 13 per cent of the firms have plans for moving parts of the 
production abroad whereas 5 per cent consider shifting the entire production 
across the Italian border (Fondazione Nord-Est, 2004). A Dutch survey comes 
up with similar figures (Berenschot, 2004). It shows that 84 per cent of the 
companies have not performed any relocation activities in the last ten years and 
does not plan to relocate within the next twelve months. Relocation affected 
1.5 to 3.4 per cent of employment over the three year period before the survey 
(2004). Relocation to a large extent takes place within Europe: 52 per cent of 
the firms relocated to Middle and East Europe, 42 per cent to West and South 
Europe, 16 per cent to China, and 11 per cent to India.9 Finnish enterprise 
surveys tell that firms intend to expand faster in Russia, Eastern Central 
Europe and China than in Western Europe and the USA (Pajarinen and Ylä-
Anttila, 2004). 
According to the surveys both savings on costs and market access are 
important motives for relocation. In the Dutch survey cost savings stand out: 
62 per cent of the relocating firms mention costs as a decisive reason. The 
Finnish survey indicates that the main motives for expansion in Western 
Europe and in the USA are market factors and firm specific know-how 
(Pajarinen and Ylä-Anttila, 2004). In China as well as in Eastern Europe and 
Russia, the main motives are market growth and cost factors (ibid.; Alho, 
Kaitila and Kotilainen, 2004). In the case of Russia and the Baltic states also 
the near geographical location is an important factor for different forms of 
foreign business operations (Kotilainen et al, 2003). In a survey by the German 
chamber of commerce firms consider relocation because of high taxes (38 per 
cent), high labour costs (45 per cent), exchange rate risk (7 per cent) or 
excessive bureaucracy (5 per cent) (Buch et al., 2005). However, when asked 
directly, for most of these firms the cost saving motive does not dominate. 
More important motives are improving access to fast growing foreign markets 
or providing distribution services to foreign markets.  
The costs motive is even more important for banks; a survey among 
European banks finds that for 90 per cent cost reduction is the main reason for 
outsourcing (see Pujals, 2005). Since operations of banks are still very much 
vertically integrated, the scope for outsourcing seems large (for example, 
software development and financial administration). However, only 25 per cent 
of the banks in the sample think of outsourcing to offshore locations. Al in all, 
the different surveys are broadly in line with the trade and investment statistics.  
3.3.2  SECTORAL PATTERNS 
Since in low-wage countries like China and India unskilled labour is abundant, 
they are expected to specialise in production that requires manual labour and 
involves simple production processes. From this one could derive that Europe 
will see growing imports of textiles and toys from these countries. However, 
imports of other, more advanced products have grown even faster.  
 
9 Figures do not add to 100 per cent because companies could indicate several relocation 
destinations. 
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In Table 3.5 total EU-15 imports are divided into low-tech, medium-tech 
and high-tech goods. Almost half of low-tech imports consist of foodstuffs 
and live animals, around one-third of iron, non-ferrous metals and paper. 
Major medium-tech goods are fuels and chemicals, which account for around 
one-third of the total. The high-tech category consists of office equipment (34 
per cent) transport equipment and parts (20 per cent), telecom equipment (13 
per cent) and electronic components (13 per cent).  
Most of the EU-15 imports consist of medium-tech and high-tech goods. 
Their share is growing whereas the share of low-tech goods is limited and 
falling. One explanation is that transport costs and other trade barriers do not 
fall for low-tech goods as fast as for the other goods. Another explanation is 
that demand in the European economies shifts away from the low-tech goods. 
Table 3.5 also gives a break-down of imports to origin. More than half of 
the imports originates in the EU-15 members itself. The EU-15 share of total 
imports has declined somewhat in favour of Asia and Eastern Europe between 
1995 and 2002. Imports from China have increased by nearly 19 per cent per 
year. 
Table 3.5:  Geographical distribution of EU-15 imports by technological level, 1995-2003,  
percentage share of the total and average annual percentage growtha
 Shares in 2003   Average growth in 1995-2003  
 Total Low-Tech Med-Tech High-Tech Total Low-Tech Med-Tech High-Tech
EU - 15 57.0 12.6 23.1 21.3 5.1 2.3 6.4 5.8 
United States 6.6 0.5 3.0 3.1 4.7 -1.0 7.3 3.7 
Eastern Europe 4.8 0.8 1.7 2.3 14.9 6.4 11.2 25.5 
Asia (excl. Japan) 12.8 1.5 6.1 5.2 10.2 6.5 8.9 13.5 
        China 4.2 0.3 2.1 1.8 18.9 12.8 15.2 27.8 
        India 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 7.0 5.4 7.2 12.6 
Rest  of the world 18.8 3.8 10.2 4.8 6.3 3.1 8.0 5.7 
Total 100.0 19.2 44.0 36.7 6.2 2.8 7.3 7.1 
Source: ICT/WTO database 
a SITC classification, see http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry(bottom left corner of the page) Low-tech consists of 
classes of goods 0, 1, 24, 25 and 63-68. Medium-Tech consist of classes of goods of 21-23, 26-29, 3, 4,  5 , 61-62,69, 8 
and 9. SITC category 7 is defined as High-tech. 
 
Strikingly imports of high-tech goods are growing faster than imports in 
other categories from China, India and Eastern European countries. A priori, 
one would not expect these countries to have a comparative advantage in high-
tech goods. Nevertheless, the principle of comparative advantage may still 
explain this pattern of international trade. Asian and Eastern European are 
likely to specialise in those parts of high-tech production, that do not 
necessarily require highly skilled, highly specialised workers and that concern 
fairly standardised products. Related to that, foreign direct investment from the 
richest countries may actually have been essential for the production of ‘high-
tech’ goods in developing and transition countries. The richest countries export 
know-how and technology, and import (components of) high-tech goods. 
Indeed, lower transport costs and other trade barriers have promoted vertical 
specialization; especially the production chain for high-tech goods has become 
fragmented. The European Union may benefit less from the new, better 
possibilities to outsource production than the United States. One reason is that 
the Union is specialised in medium-tech goods (for example chemicals), for 
which the possibilities for outsourcing do not seem to expand as fast as for 
high-tech goods.  
A parallel trend occurs in the trade of services. As with goods, there are 
major differences in tradability among the services. Most services still require 
physical proximity of consumers and producers, but with the emergence of 
information and communication technology, some standardised services have 
become tradable, such as software development, payroll administration, 
transaction processing and technical support. While total cross-border trade in 
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goods and services has expanded more or less in line between 1992 and 2001, 
shifts have occurred in services trade during this period. Table 3.6 shows that 
the share of computer and information services in total services trade has more 
or less doubled, from 1.4 per cent in 1992 to 2.7 per cent in 2001. In particular 
computer services seem responsible for this increase; the share of computer 
services has risen between 1998 and 2002 from 1.7 per cent to 2.3 per cent. 
The table also shows that trade in services such as administration has grown 
relatively rapidly. UNCTAD (2004, p. 147) examines the relocation of services 
in detail, but also warns that ‘although recent media attention may suggest 
otherwise, to date, the magnitude … is relatively small, albeit growing fast’.  
Table 3.6:  Import of selected services, 1992 ,1997 and 2002, share as a  per 
cent of total import in services 
 1992 1997 2002 
Computer and information services 1.4 1.8 2.7 
Business services 28.6 30.0 36.2 
Legal, accounting, management consulting  and 
public relations services 1.8 2.6 3.7 
Research and development 2.3 2.4 2.7 
Other business services 20.2 22.1 26.6 
Services between related enterprises, n.i.e. 4.3 3.0 3.2 
Source: OECD Trade in Services (2003). 
3.3.3   CONCLUSION 
The choice of location is largely informed by its characteristics. Different links 
in the production chain can move to different countries (vertical specialisation). 
The motivation behind this are cost differences between countries, arising 
from differences in the availability of factors of production, for instance. The 
same link in the production chain can be duplicated in different countries 
(horizontal specialisation). The motivation behind this is market access.  
Some surveys may paint a sombre picture of relocation. But largely surveys 
are in line with the trade and investment statistics. Most of Europe’s inward 
and outward direct investment takes place with the United States or remains 
within Europe. Investment in low-wage countries is not only very small in 
absolute terms, it is not rising very fast either. Trade flows present a slightly 
different picture. The United States is Europe’s largest trade partner by far. In 
addition, individual European countries largely trade with other European 
countries. However, the share of imports from Eastern Europe and Asia is 
growing fast.  
Trade in goods and services is expanding rapidly as a result of 
internationalisation, but there are considerable differences between products. A 
striking feature is the rapid growth in high-tech imports. The same is true for 
the imports of some services, such as software and administration. 
 
 
3.4 
Consequences 
of relocation 
3.4.1 GAINS AND LOSSES  
Falling costs of international transactions provide new opportunities to 
organise production and trade, implying efficiency gains for the global 
economy. The participating countries may share these gains in various ways. 
The traditional argument is that countries gain by importing at a lower price 
and by exporting at a better price. But in the economic literature many other 
arguments have been put forward. Among other things, better opportunities 
for international trade and investment are considered to:  
• lower mark-ups and allow a better exploitation of scale economies (see 
e.g. Smith and Venables, 1998); 
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• offer a greater scope for the most productive companies, boosting 
average productivity (see e.g. Melitz, 2003, and Baldwin and Forslid, 
2004);  
• expand the range of available product varieties (see e.g. Romer, 1994);  
• foster the international exchange of ideas and technologies  (see e.g. 
Coe and Helpman, 1995). 
For Europe there is scattered direct evidence for the idea that relocation to 
foreign location contributes to productivity of domestic firms. For example, 
Barba Navaretti and Castellani (2004) find that for Italian firms investment 
abroad is associated with higher productivity and not with lower employment. 
Furthermore, Egger, Pfaffermayer and Wolfmayr (2001) arrive at the result that 
for Austrian sectors outsourcing is related to (total factor) productivity. 
Even when better opportunities for international trade in goods, services 
and capital imply a global gain in welfare, individual countries may not benefit. 
In the economic literature at least two possibilities appear. First, lower barriers 
to trade and investment may lead to adverse changes in a country’s terms-of-
trade. Second, changes in trade and production patterns may magnify 
distortions in a country’s economy. Of particular interest is the possibility that 
a country sees a cluster of economic activities dissolve and that it can no longer 
enjoy the benefits from this cluster. These two possibilities are discussed in 
somewhat more detail below.  
Terms-of-trade losses 
A country may see its welfare decline when opportunities to trade and invest 
expand or growth elsewhere accelerates. These concerns are far from new. 
Bhagwati et al. (2004) recall that in the 1950s the brisk growth of the American 
economy raised concerns about the level of economic welfare in Europe and 
that in the 1970s fast economic development in Japan led to similar concerns 
in the United States. These concerns are addressed in the economic literature. 
Bhagwati et al. point to old work by Johnson (1954 and 1955) that shows how 
growth in one country − through terms-of-trade effects − lead to income 
changes in other countries. Samuelson (2004) reiterates this result. But also in 
recent work the economic interaction through the term-of-trade changes is 
central. Acemoglu and Ventura (2000) present an empirical analysis showing 
that a country’s growth (through capital accumulation and technology 
convergence) is accompanied with terms-of-trade losses and spills over to 
other countries. In other words, growth brings these other countries a gain and 
not a loss. Growing possibilities for outsourcing may imply losses for some 
countries, suited for integrated production. Markusen and Venables (2005) 
stress this simulation result.  
Yet, the trade and investment flows between poor and rich countries are 
small fractions of the total. Large changes in small flows are not likely to bring 
about important terms-of-trade changes. More important for Europe is 
perhaps the accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the 
European Union. The enlargement may bring a gain to the Union as a whole, 
but the question is whether each EU member shares it. Baldwin et al. (1997) 
and Lejour et al. (2004) have studied the effects of the enlargement. The 
benefits for the accession countries are clear, although the two studies disagree 
on the size: an increase in gross domestic production with 1.5 per cent versus 
7.8 per cent. Both studies also predict an increase in GDP for the EU-15 
member states of 0.2 percentage points. This increase is modest but it is clearly 
not a decrease.  
Countries are more likely to avoid the possibility of losses and to share the 
global gains from better trade and investment opportunities, the better their 
economy adjusts to changes in world markets. To minimise the loss of falling 
world market prices in some sectors, the sectoral structure must adapt. It will 
be easier to bring about a sectoral shift if the labour force is better skilled for 
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two reasons. First, higher and broader educated workers are more employable, 
they more easily become productive in new activities. Second, comparative 
advantage for Europe lies in high-productive sectors with a high skill intensity. 
Skill upgrading of the labour force facilitates the shift towards these sectors.  
External effects of agglomerations 
Separate location decisions can reinforce each other. There are advantages to 
agglomeration, which often have the character of external effects. For one 
thing, not only does a company’s new plant benefit from the proximity of its 
suppliers and customers, these suppliers and customers also benefit from the 
proximity of the new plant. And for another, companies can contribute to the 
local knowledge stock, from which other companies can benefit in turn. When 
clustering of (certain) activities have positive external effects, relocation may 
imply potentially important losses for a country. Krugman and Venables (1995) 
stress this possibility. In a theoretical model they show that falling trade 
barriers can induce important changes in agglomeration patterns. When a 
country sees capital and firms leave, it may not only lose these firms but also 
associated clusters of activity.10
However, the possibility of important changes in economic geography is 
somewhat theoretical, for at least three reasons. First, core-periphery patterns 
are quite stable. Location decisions reinforce each other, so that firms are 
unlikely to reconsider them quickly. Up to a certain threshold, the core-
periphery patterns are immune to differences in wage costs or government 
policies to strengthen competitiveness. The fast economic development of 
India and China may not have a strong effect on the European centre of 
activities but rather have an impact at the periphery of the world economy. 
Second, there are also disadvantages to agglomeration, ranging from high land 
and house prices to congestion of public infrastructure. These disadvantages 
sometimes also have the character of an external effect. The most telling 
example is road congestion. Consequently, it is not clear a priori whether the 
separate and uncoordinated location decisions lead, from the perspective of 
society, to not enough or too much agglomeration. Third, the core-periphery 
patterns are particularly strong at a regional level. For instance, the differences 
between city and countryside are stark. Brakman et al. (2005) estimate that 
within the European Union broadly two-thirds of the variation between output 
per square kilometre – a measure of the extent to which a location would 
function as a core – can be found at subprovincial level. They also estimate 
that the geographical reach of agglomeration advantages is limited to only 
several tens of kilometres. The new economic geography thus seems 
particularly relevant at the regional level within a country.  
The three reasons do not deny positive externalities from clustering on an 
economy altogether. R&D is a good counterexample. A striking feature of 
R&D activities, and possibly of other ways of knowledge production as well, is 
that they generate clearly identifiable external effects. Spending by one firm will 
benefit other firms in the sector, but also other sectors at home and abroad. 
The extent of the benefit depends on the links with the innovating firm, which 
arise from economic transactions but are also determined by physical 
proximity. Researchers can learn from each other. Despite the internet and e-
mail, personal contact is still the most appropriate means of exchanging 
knowledge. An international airport is therefore important, but the physical 
proximity of other researchers is even more important. Indeed, the external 
 
10 On local distortions related to agglomeration external effects see also Gaffard and Quéré 
(2005) 
   WHEN JOBS DISAPPEAR AND WORKERS DO NOT…  53 
effects diminish sharply as the distance increases.11 These external effects may 
therefore constitute a reason for formulating government policy.12
 
Box 1: Agglomeration of ICT production or use: Can relocation of ICT 
activities prove unfavourable? 
Production and application of information and communication technology 
can have external effects on the rest of the economy and prompt an 
agglomeration of companies. Information on these external effects is limited, 
however, and the various studies that have been undertaken have yielded 
conflicting findings. 
Agglomeration of companies is frequent in the case of ICT production. 
The best-known example is Silicon Valley in California. Minne and Van der 
Wiel (2004) offer another example. They point to the Eindhoven region, 
where a wide range of ICT companies appeared around Philips and the 
Technical University of Eindhoven.  
It is unclear whether and to what extent the production of ICT goods and 
services and their agglomeration have external effects on the rest of the 
economy. Daveri and Silva (2004) convincingly argue that Nokia has 
contributed directly to Finnish productivity growth, but that the indirect, 
external effect on that growth has been limited. One of the reasons is that 
Nokia and the associated service companies do not have strong ties with 
other industries. 
The application of information and communication technology can have 
external effects on productivity. For instance, Van Leeuwen and Van der Wiel 
(2003) show for the Netherlands that investments in one company have a 
substantial effect on the productivity of another company in the same sector. 
This fits in with Mun and Nadiri (2002), who find a similar effect in a study 
of 42 US industries. This suggests that the departure of ICT-intensive 
companies can harm an economy. However, an empirical study by Stiroh 
(2002) finds no evidence of external effects. 
In short, the picture from the economic literature is unclear. Both the 
production and application of information and communication technology 
can have external effects, but the evidence is far from overwhelming.  
 
3.4.2   LOSERS: (LOW-SKILLED) WORKERS 
Workers may lose their jobs as a result of the relocation of business activities. 
They will then have to look for other jobs. Low-skilled workers in particular 
will not find that easy. Their position in the labour market is relatively 
unfavourable, and relocation does not make it any better, because they are 
competing indirectly with other low-skilled workers elsewhere in the world. 
The implications of relocation for the labour market position of the low-
skilled and for transitional unemployment are sometimes a cause for concern. 
That is understandable. But how relevant is this concern? The existing 
economic literature gives an impression: relocation offers little cause for 
concern about the position of the low-skilled workers and for the concern 
about transitional unemployment. This section will explain this. 
Is the unfavourable labour market position of low-skilled workers due to 
relocation? 
Wage inequality between high- and low-skilled workers has been widening over 
the last few decades. In the United Kingdom and the United States  the wages 
 
11 See e.g. Keller, 2001. 
12 Agglomeration of researchers is not accompanied by clearly identifiable negative external 
effects (such as congestion). 
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of low-skilled workers are actually falling in real terms, while those of high-
skilled workers are rising steadily. This trend in wage differentials is less 
pronounced on the European continent, but evident enough. Moreover, it is 
unfolding against a background of deindustrialisation and is accompanied by 
relatively high unemployment among low-skilled workers. Because of the social 
security provisions, the wages of low-skilled workers cannot fall sufficiently, 
and therefore unemployment among them is rising. 
It is tempting to point an accusing finger at international specialisation. And 
with some justification, because international specialisation drags down the 
prices of goods whose production requires relatively low-skilled work, putting 
the remuneration of low-skilled workers under pressure. 
We should not jump to conclusions, though. As mentioned, the lion’s share 
of trade and investment takes place between similar countries. The reason is 
not comparative advantage. The relocation to dissimilar countries is simply too 
small to explain the widening wage inequality in full (Krugman, 1995). 
Moreover, prices are rising precisely in those industries most exposed to 
competition from low-wage countries. One explanation for widening wage 
inequality is therefore what has been called ‘skill-biased technological change’, 
that is, technological developments which have a relatively favourable effect on 
the productivity and wages of high-skilled workers. The ICT revolution springs 
to mind here. 
Ultimately the question whether widening wage inequality is due to 
international specialisation or technological change is an empirical one. The 
relevant literature is extensive and diverse, and a clear answer does not readily 
offer itself. Nevertheless, there is a consensus among economists that the role 
of international specialisation is subordinate. Most economists conclude that 
international specialisation has no significant effect on pay inequality. Even 
Feenstra and Hanson (2001), who champion the role of international 
specialisation, find that on the basis of macrodata only 10-35 per cent of the 
growth in income inequality can be attributed to international specialisation.  
The knowledge that international specialisation is probably not the main 
culprit, is certainly relevant for policymakers. Firstly, it means that countering 
wage inequality by frustrating international specialisation with trade barriers 
and the like will not be very effective. At most it will prevent firms taking 
advantage of the opportunities offered by globalisation. Secondly, regardless of 
the cause, the widening inequality between high- and low-skilled workers 
implies that the return on education is increasing. Barriers in the way of 
education and training (such as high drop-out rates) which leave the labour 
force’s potential untapped, will thus become more expensive. What is more, if 
the labour force is better educated and trained, it is easier to realise shifts 
within and between sectors. 
Does relocation lead to unemployment over the short term? 
International specialisation is accompanied by restructuring, both within and 
between sectors. This inevitably leads to job destruction and job creation, 
which may lead to frictional unemployment. The move from one job to the 
next may take time and for some job seekers, this interval between jobs may be 
considerable, especially if they lose skills and become less attractive to 
employers. Frictional unemployment is of course not uniquely linked to 
international specialisation. Job destruction and job creation is a normal part of 
the economic process. A rough calculation shows that substantial relocation 
does not contribute significantly to the normal flows on the national labour 
market. A study by Forrester (2004) projects job losses of 220,000 per year due 
to relocation, which again pales into insignificance compared to the dynamism 
of the US labour market, where between 15 and 25 million jobs disappear 
every year. According to Kierkegaard (2004), this is not surprising. He points 
out that ‘overseas location’ was the direct cause of only 1 per cent of all mass 
redundancies in the United States in 2003. From a survey of studies for France 
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Daudin and Levasseur (2005) conclude that until the early 1990s trade with 
developing countries accounts for a total of 150,000 to 300,000 jobs lost, 
compared to total employment of roughly 2.2 million. Their review ‘suggests 
that most French employment developments were not related to international 
trade but had domestic causes’.  In a study on the United Kingdom, Amiti and 
Wei (2004) find no link between the extent of outsourcing and employment in 
78 sectors. Where outsourcing leads to job losses, this is offset by comparable 
job creation in the same sector. They do not make a distinction between the 
outsource location. 
It is interesting that for 7 EU countries outsourcing to low-wage countries 
has a negative effect on employment whereas outsourcing to other (high-wage) 
countries does not have a clear, positive or negative effect. According to Falk 
and Wolfmayer (2005) this effect has contributed to the employment decrease 
in manufacturing. Over the period 1995-2000 the annual decrease was on 
average at least 0.25 percentage points.  
At the national level the job losses due to relocation are thus relatively 
small. However, at a regional level the impact of relocation can sometimes be 
considerable. International specialisation could thus be responsible for major 
regional employers going under. Little or nothing is known about the regional 
effects of relocation. Regional variations in unemployment point to 
imperfections in European labour markets. Ideally, job seekers from a region 
with relatively high unemployment should look for jobs in regions with 
relatively low unemployment. But apparently, interregional mobility is limited. 
3.4.3   LOSERS: THE PUBLIC SECTOR? 
Often governments can only change the characteristics of their countries 
slowly and indirectly. The education and training of the labour force and the 
production methods of companies spring to mind here. However, there are 
policy variables which seem to have a direct impact on the location of 
activities: corporation taxes, environmental standards and employment 
conditions. Hence one question is how important these policy variables are in 
relation to countries’ macro-economic characteristics. Another, related 
question is whether actual or threatened relocation induces competition 
between governments. There is a concern that governments may pursue 
beggar-thy-neighbour policies in this respect. Policy may be rational from the 
perspective of an individual government, but collectively it may be inefficient. 
This can throw a different light on the desirability or otherwise of relocation.  
In this section we will examine two areas of influence: taxes on firms and 
environmental standards. We focus on two prominent examples rather than 
examine all policy options. 
Policy competition: corporate taxes 
Governments try to attract and retain investment in several ways. One of them 
is to offer favourable corporate tax rates or energy tax rates. This can lead to 
competition among governments, resulting in low tax rates on firms. This has 
become more likely with the enlargement of the European Union, because the 
new member states have lower corporate tax rates than the original 15 
members. Some analysts believe that competing on tax rates will make it ever 
more difficult for governments to carry out their core public tasks while others 
see it as a brake on the otherwise unbridled expansion of the public sectors. 
What is the effect of corporate taxes on inward foreign investment? 
Comparing the outcomes of many empirical studies, Ederveen and de Mooij 
(2003) conclude that a 1 percentage point reduction in the tax rate (from 34.5 
per cent to 33.5 per cent, say) eventually raises the stock of total foreign 
investment by 3.3 per cent: a demonstrable effect. But it still leaves open the 
question whether this effect is large or small or whether this is worthwhile. 
And perhaps more importantly, it leaves open the question whether 
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governments consider this effect large or small, a question that marks the 
difference between a race and no race to cut corporate tax rates. 
So does tax competition exist? At first glance governments do not seem to 
be competing, or only to a very limited extent. In West European countries 
corporate and energy tax revenues (as a proportion of output) have not fallen 
over time. It seems that when governments set tax rates for firms, they are not 
guided by the effect on foreign investment, although these investments have 
become more important.13
Yet, there are signs of tax competition. Energy tax rates are lower for firms 
than they are for households. And while corporate tax revenues have remained 
stable, the various statutory tax rates have fallen over time, indeed a fact that is 
evidence of tax competition (see also Griffith and Klemm (2004) for an 
overview of empirical work on tax competition). Multinational concerns try to 
account for profits in countries where the tax rates are lowest. Since deductible 
items, which determine the tax liability for an individual company, are generally 
linked to real capital, the applicable tax rates are relevant for the location of 
paper profits. Multinationals can ensure that these are accounted for in low-tax 
countries through ‘transfer pricing’, i.e. by manipulating purchasing and selling 
prices within the concern. Much more mobile than production plants are the 
profits generated by them, which can be channelled from one subsidiary to 
another, a process which probably exerts pressure on tax rates. The effect of 
those rates on foreign investment seems less important. 
Environmental standards 
A company’s location choice may also be influenced by differences in 
environmental standards. The concern here is that companies will gather at 
locations with relatively low standards (so called ‘pollution havens’). These 
locations are to be found in developing countries, for instance, where poverty 
acts as a constraint on environmental concerns and standards are not very high. 
Relocation towards such locations may undermine the strict environmental 
policies of developed countries or undermine the wellbeing of local 
populations. 
There is empirical literature on the influence of environmental standards on 
location choice. An overview by Bollen et al. (2002) on this matter shows that 
this influence is rather limited. And in a study of foreign investment in some 
US states between 1977 and1994, Keller and Levinson (1999) find a small 
effect for polluting industries, but no clear and significant effect on investment 
flows to states, which is striking. After all, US states compete fiercely with each 
other (certainly more than countries) in attracting foreign investors. 
Environmental standards could therefore play a role in location choice, but it 
turns out that they are often not decisive. Factors other than environmental 
standards play a role, and these evidently weigh more heavily. This does not 
exclude the possibility that policy competition may sometimes be of 
importance. It is noteworthy, for instance, that energy taxes for businesses are 
appreciably lower than those for households. 
Summary 
The macro-economic characteristics of countries largely determine the location 
of business activities. Often governments can only change these characteristics 
 
13 Baldwin and Krugman (2004) distinguish between the core and periphery in Europe. Core 
countries – the Benelux, France, Germany and Italy – offer companies a relatively favourable 
geographical location, not least because many major customers and suppliers are based in the 
core. According to Baldwin and Krugman, these countries can cream off this advantage (‘rent’) 
without companies leaving. In short, countries in the European core can afford to levy relatively 
high tax rates. The countries on the periphery – Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain – have to 
accept lower tax rates. 
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indirectly and slowly. That is why the geographical patterns of foreign trade 
and foreign direct investment do not show abrupt shocks. 
However, governments can exert a direct influence on location choices, in 
particular regarding corporate tax rates. In this respect governments seem to be 
involved in mutual competition. This may generate inefficiencies when 
companies are taxed at different rates. The corporate tax will weigh less on 
multinational companies than on domestically oriented companies. 
Even so, differences in corporation tax rates do not have a disastrous effect 
on foreign direct investment. Other policy variables only have a limited 
influence. This applies at least for environmental standards, but probably also 
for employment protection legislation, administrative burdens and other policy 
variables which are important for the investment climate. The reason is that 
apart from policy variables, there are many other factors which determine 
companies’ location decisions. 
3.4.4   CONCLUSION 
All in all, relocation offers several advantages, while the potential disadvantages 
are limited. Relocation is an integral part of commercial relations between 
countries. Europe gains a number of advantages from the free flow of goods, 
services and capital. Consumers and companies benefit from low import prices. 
Commercial relations between countries also give greater scope to productive 
companies, access to a wider range of specialised products, the potential for 
scale economies, and the potential to learn from other companies. Some 
disadvantages also relate to the free flow of goods, services and capital, 
however. Firstly, international competition could force a number of European 
companies to reduce their export prices. Hence, adjustments in the economic 
sector structure are a necessary condition for not losing out in the free flow of 
goods, services and capital. Secondly, the growing opportunities for 
international trade and investment may influence the income distribution. 
High-skilled workers and owners of knowledge capital will benefit, while low-
skilled workers may lose out. However, the effects on low-skilled wages and 
unemployment seem to be limited. Because the disadvantages can be avoided 
and/or are limited, Europe on balance benefits from the free flow of goods, 
services and capital, and thus also from relocation. 
 
 There are many views on relocation. Some analysts believe that it offers new 
opportunities for Europe whereas others are worried about job losses and 
lower wages. These views yield different perspectives on the role of 
government. Below we will concentrate on the role of government from the 
perspective of the analysis in the earlier sections. 
3.5 
Government 
policy 
A case for further economic integration 
The important role of distance in international economic relations suggests that 
the gains from international trade are far from exhausted. Indeed, the 
European Union is in the position to create further gains by broadening and 
deepening the internal market and by pushing for multilateral trade 
liberalisation.  
 
The need for sectoral restructuring 
European countries can benefit from international trade and investment. 
Among other things, they allow companies to purchase more cheaply abroad 
(rather than produce themselves) and sell at a better price abroad (rather than 
sell in the home market).  
A precondition, however, is that the sector structure adjusts to changes on 
the world market. Not least owing to the rapid growth of China and the new 
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EU member states, some sectors will face more competition and lower profit 
margins. Investment and jobs in those sectors will have to contract. Of course, 
for some European firms exports to these countries are new sources of profit. 
(By exporting know-how they fuel the economic growth in these countries.) 
Even so, it is important that investment and jobs shift to other sectors. This 
helps to secure the net benefits from international specialisation. Hence it is the 
task of government to facilitate sectoral shifts in the economic structure. 
Yet, the adjustments in sectoral structure should be seen in perspective. The 
extent of relocation seems limited, contrary to what the media sometimes 
suggest. Statistics show that trade and investment tend to flow between 
‘similar’ countries. It is true that the share of developing and transition 
countries is growing rapidly, but it is still small. 
Special attention for research and development 
The location choices of individual companies are sometimes interconnected. 
Agglomeration may generate external effects. In principle, these external effects 
are an excellent reason for government action.  
• Agglomeration of suppliers and customers: This plays at the regional 
level in particular, and is of only limited significance for national 
economic growth. Moreover, not all external effects are positive; some 
are negative. Thus it is unclear whether there is not enough or too 
much agglomeration of economic activities. 
• Agglomeration of researchers: The external effects of European 
research and development are substantial, and what is more, they 
largely accrue to European countries. However, agglomeration 
patterns are difficult to change. Attracting ‘new’ activities will be more 
successful than attracting ‘existing’ activities. Moreover, market failure 
should not be replaced by government failure, for instance when 
governments err in picking winners.  
Improving the functioning of European labour markets 
Relocation to low-wage countries raises a concern that it will push wage levels 
downwards and unemployment upwards in developing countries.  
• Low-skilled workers in Europe compete with low-skilled workers 
elsewhere through product markets. Booming economies in some 
developing and transition countries as well as internationalisation 
mean that competition is intensifying. This may put the wages of low-
skilled workers under pressure. Insofar as social security provisions 
(unemployment benefit, minimum wage etc) put a floor under their 
wages, this can lead to structurally higher unemployment among low-skilled 
workers. The government then faces the awkward choice of lowering 
this floor and accepting greater income inequality between low- and 
high-skilled workers, or maintaining the floor and accepting higher 
unemployment among the low-skilled. This choice lies with our 
politicians. They may take some inequality for granted, reform social 
security and enhance labour market flexibility. Or they may opt for 
more outlays on support of low-skilled people, if they highly value 
equity and the position of the low-skilled. However, the dominant 
view in the economic literature is that international competition 
between low-skilled workers is limited. Trade and investment flows 
between rich and poor countries are relatively modest. The 
deteriorating position of low-skilled workers is often primarily 
attributed to technological change, which of course does not make the 
political choice less awkward. 
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• International specialisation is accompanied by job destruction and job 
creation. In this way it contributes to frictional unemployment. It is not 
very clear how large this contribution is exactly, but the labour market 
is very dynamic in any case. The government can try to make the 
transition from one job to another easier. This may be part of a general 
policy aimed at encouraging participation in the labour market. 
Policy coordination is sometimes useful 
Governments try to influence location choices through policies. If there is no 
coordination between countries, this may be an argument for an individual 
country to react. However, there are several reasons for a cautious stance in 
this respect. 
• The external effects of the activities to be attracted are often small or 
unclear. Exceptions may be R&D activities (see above). 
• The influence of government policy on location choice is often 
limited. This seems to apply for environmental standards but also for 
other policy options. Corporate taxation is an exception. Tax 
competition takes place above all because paper profits are highly 
mobile, and coordination at a European level in some form seems 
desirable. If such coordination does not arise, countries may feel the 
need to lower the tax burden on firms (for example through an across-
the-board reduction of corporate tax rates or by introducing 
competitiveness zones.)  
What is the role of education and knowledge? 
At various points in this article, two arguments come to the fore which call for 
a climate in which education and training improve the labour force’s potential 
effectively and in which business investment in knowledge can thrive. First, in 
some countries there is a trend towards growing inequality between low- and 
high-skilled workers, and international specialisation may force shifts within 
and between sectors. Therefore, any barriers which thwart education and 
training will become more expensive. Moreover, it is easier to realise shifts 
within and between sectors if workers are more employable through better 
education and training.  
Second, without making a deliberate choice, Europe can attract or start 
‘new’ activities by offering a climate in which investment in those activities is 
profitable. Knowledge (not only of new technologies but also of ideas, for 
instance) will be central to these ‘new’ activities.14 From this perspective, an 
effective knowledge infrastructure is required.  
What are the impacts on relocation of supporting specific sectors or 
firms? 
Now and then proposals are put forward to support sectors or firms. Typically, 
the support is directed to those sectors and firms that have proven to be 
successful (national or European champions) and/or that are involved in 
developing and applying new technologies. These proposals may have the 
specific aim of stopping the process of deindustrialisation or raising the rate of 
economic growth. The general background is, however, that European sectors 
and firms are thought to need support to withstand foreign competition. 
Mathieu and Sterdyniak (2005) provide an overview of the different proposals 
that have been floated up to now. 
Whether specific support is an effective and efficient way to achieve the 
specific aim of reversing deindustrialisation or boosting growth, does not 
 
14 See Widgren (2005) for an empirical analysis of comparative advantage and human capital.  
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concern us here. Instead, the question is what the impacts on relocation are. 
Crucial in the different proposals is that support does not go directly to 
activities that require relatively little skills or know-how and in which emerging 
economies have a comparative advantage. So, the different proposals may 
make some sectors or firms more competitive, but they do not seem to stop 
the ongoing relocation of these activities. In fact, the champions are as a rule 
exactly those firms that operate in more than one country and that are able to 
shift activities across borders. Specific support to successful firms or sectors 
may thus even increase the scale of relocation towards emerging economies. 
Beyond relocation 
All in all an economic analysis of relocation offers only a limited number of 
motives for government policy. However, the government may still need to 
play this role from a different perspective. For example, attracting or retaining 
economic activities may not be a decisive or even a good reason for efforts to 
improve the investment climate for foreign companies. Such efforts are, 
however, appropriate if they primarily stimulate domestic investment. 
Relocation in the future 
The empirical evidence is clear: relocation towards Asian countries or towards 
East European countries has not had a large impact on labour markets in the 
West and South Europe up to now. This will not change overnight. The 
growth in international trade and investment has been and will be a gradual 
process. But may the impact of relocation change in the more distant future? 
The data show, for example, that the share of China in trade and investment 
flows is small but growing fast (see Section 3.3). More generally, the process of 
internationalisation will continue. In a globalisation scenario for the European 
economy openness is projected to increase 29 per cent in 2000 to 43 per cent 
in 2040.15 In a scenario like this new government policies may become relevant.  
When considering the more distant future, one should not overlook several 
developments that make a simple extrapolation of current trends invalid. First, 
the pace of internationalisation depends on trade agreements. Indeed, this 
globalisation scenario assumes among other things a successful Doha round. 
Second, further integration within the European Union may make trade and 
investment flows with Asia less important. This explains that in the last 
decades the share of intra-EU trade has been relatively stable. Third, economic 
growth will lead to higher wages in emerging economies. Indeed, some firms 
already experience problems with turnover of high skilled staff in regional 
labour markets of emerging countries.  
 
 Free flows of goods, services and capital bring the European Union 
important gains. They also imply that production facilities and jobs are 
sometimes relocated elsewhere. Trade and capital flows to and from low-wage 
countries, that are driven by cost differences, are rising relatively rapidly but 
still take up a relatively small share of the total. By consequence, the impact of 
competition from low-wage countries on the European labour markets is small. 
3.6 
Conclusion 
One ‘problem’ is that the advantages are not eye-catching. Relocation will 
make companies more productive. Under the pressure of competition, owners 
of companies (shareholders) cannot appropriate the gains of higher 
productivity through higher profits. They have to share the gains with 
customers and workers, in the form of lower prices and higher wages. In this 
way the advantages of relocation are spread across the economy, and 
consequently they are often not directly visible. At the same time the 
 
15 Openness is measured by imports as a percentage of production. The numbers apply to the 
EU-15 and are derived from one of the CPB scenario’s (de Mooij and Tang, 2003).  
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disadvantages are all too clear. In many cases the relocation of business 
activities involves job losses. If redundant workers do not find a new job or 
only do so after a long time, they will experience some of these disadvantages. 
Even so, regular headlines about relocation should not create the impression 
that many jobs are lost in this way.  
The difference between clearly visible disadvantages of relocation and 
advantages that are difficult to observe is relevant for policy makers. Policy 
makers need to take both sides of the coin into account when they want to 
make informed decisions and when they participate in the public debate. In 
addition, several more specific policy conclusions follow from this analysis: 
• By promoting trade liberalisation and a more integrated internal 
market policy may reap further gains from trade.  
• Policy can facilitate sectoral shifts in Europe to adapt to emerging 
economies.  
• Research and development warrant special attention because in their 
location decisions private actors do not take benefits from 
agglomeration and knowledge spillovers into account.  
• Within social Europe, the policy dilemma intensifies between higher 
income inequality and higher unemployment of low-skilled workers. 
However, only to a limited extent this dilemma results from 
competition by low-skilled workers outside Europe and from 
relocation. Technological change is more important.  
• Primarily to prevent tax competition, policy coordination on corporate 
taxes seems desirable. 
• Investments in education and training enhance employability and 
specialisation in knowledge-intensive activities. That supports shifts in 
specialisation patterns towards a more knowledge-intensive European 
economy. 
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APPENDIX 1: ON THE REFORM 
OF THE STABILITY AND 
GROWTH PACT 
 In the middle of March, the European governments and the European 
Commission discussed changes of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
Apparently, the SGP has not worked as desired in recent years. Not only were 
budget deficits high, often reaching some 3 percent relative to GDP even 
when adjusted for the cycle; also, the corrective mechanisms could not lead to 
better outcomes in terms of the targets of the SGP. In the Council Report to 
the European Council “Improving the implementation of the Stability and 
Growth Pact” (in the following: Council Report), these changes of the SGP are 
described. They are controversial not only in the public debate but also among 
economists. The EUROFRAME Institutes therefore present two different 
views on the debate. 
 
 
JOACHIM SCHEIDE, KLAUS-JURGEN GERN (IFW),  
MALGORZATA MARKIEWICZ (CASE), WIM SUYKER (CPB) A1.1 
Higher risk of 
unsustainable 
fiscal policies 
The Council Report makes clear that the reference values of the SGP – a 3 per 
cent deficit ratio and a 60 per cent debt ratio – remain unchanged. We 
welcome this statement. However, there are now several modifications which 
raise doubts whether “… the need to reduce government debt to below 60 per 
cent of GDP at a satisfactory pace …” (Council Report: 16) can be met in 
reality.  
 
According to the Council Report, budget consolidation efforts shall take 
account of cyclical conditions. The structural budget deficits should be more 
strongly reduced in good times, whereas they may remain unchanged or may 
be reduced only slightly in bad times. In the Council Report, “good times” are 
defined as “periods where output exceeds its potential level” (Council Report: 
11), i.e. when there is a positive output gap1.  Therefore, the periods in which a 
reduction of the structural deficit is seen as appropriate are very limited. For 
example, the countries with excessive deficits can claim that actual output in 
the years 2001 to 2004 was lower than potential output, so that budget 
consolidation should not have taken place; the same will apply to 2005 and 
probably to 2006. This seems to justify ex post the actual increase of structural 
budget deficits in recent years. Even in the mentioned “good times”, the deficit 
should be reduced by only 0.5 per cent of GDP, which is given as a 
benchmark in the Council Report. Against the background that structural 
deficits in a few Member States are close to – or even above – 3 per cent of 
GDP, this implies that the (still valid) medium-term objective of budgets close 
                                                 
1 Our criticism applies – although to a lesser extent – to the case when “good times” are defined as periods 
in which actual GDP growth is higher than the growth rate of output potential, i.e. when the negative output 
gap declines. 
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to balance or in surplus will not be reached in the foreseeable future as this 
would require up to 6 years of consolidation. The target of a balanced budget 
can, in our view, only be achieved if the structural budget deficits are reduced 
considerably every year in a pre-announced way, and that this course should 
not be made dependent on the state of the business cycle. Instead, the budgets 
should be balanced in the near future according to the rules of the SGP. 
There are also other reasons why the cycle-oriented strategy proposed in 
the Council Report may not lead to the desired outcome. For example, it 
requires that fiscal policy is sufficiently flexible. However, the legislative 
process can be very time consuming so that a quick response to a “good year” 
in terms of the business cycle may not be possible. This is also one of the 
reasons why many economists are not in favour of “fine tuning” by fiscal 
policy. In addition, experience shows that such a strategy of rapid 
consolidation in good times has not worked in the past although it was agreed 
upon by the Member States. For example, many governments did not reduce 
the structural deficits in the boom year 2000. 
Another modification in the Council Report implies that each country can 
claim that special expenditures are necessary so that budget deficit above 3 per 
cent in relation to GDP would not automatically be qualified as excessive. In 
the context of the so-called “other relevant factors” (Council Report: 15), 
“special consideration” will be given to efforts related to “fostering 
international solidarity … the unification of Europe …” and so on. This rule is 
not transparent as these factors are not clearly defined and can therefore be 
subject to different interpretations. According to the German government, 
these factors include the costs of German unification. However, these costs are 
not at all the reason why the German budget deficit has exceeded 3 per cent of 
GDP in recent years. The effect of this change of the SGP is most likely that 
budget deficits will be higher than they would otherwise be. 
The same consequence follows from the change in the initial deadline for 
correcting the excessive deficit (Council Report: 18). In “case of special 
circumstances”, the deadline for correcting an excessive deficit can be set one 
year later. Sanctions are therefore even less likely than under the old rules. In 
effect, the deficits are allowed to be higher than under the old rules of the 
SGP. 
To conclude: The risk that budget deficits will be higher and that fiscal 
policy will become less sustainable in the future has increased. The recent 
modifications of the SGP allow budget deficits to be higher than originally 
intended or to remain high for a longer period of time. Therefore, it is likely 
that the debt-to-GDP ratio which in 2004 was already higher than 70 per cent 
for the Euro Area as a whole will not come down sufficiently in the coming 
years. In particular, large economies like France and Germany have 
experienced rapidly rising debt ratios in recent years – approaching values close 
to 70 per cent of GDP in 2006 – as a consequence of persistent high budget 
deficits; in Italy, the high debt ratio has hardly declined in recent years contrary 
to the rules of the SGP. The medium-term objective for budgets to be in 
balance or in surplus as well as the target for the debt-to-GDP ratio of 60 per 
cent require that high deficits should be reduced quickly and not only in “good 
times”.  
This risk of persistently high debt-to-GDP ratios is even more relevant now 
that the medium-term growth performance in the Euro Area has weakened, in 
particular in a few large Member States. The growth rate of potential nominal 
GDP in the Euro Area has declined according to most estimates and is 
probably only 4 per cent or even less, and not the assumed 5 per cent as 
underlying the reference values of the SGP. This implies that the debt-to-GDP 
ratio is likely to increase in several countries if budget deficits are higher than 
2.5 per cent of GDP. Therefore, it is even more problematic that deficits in 
excess of 3 per cent of GDP are not to be corrected as fast as under the old 
rules of the SGP. 
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All in all, we recognize the problem of enforcing rules which is a common 
problem for economic policy and which is intensively discussed in the 
economic literature. The experience with the SGP in recent years is a 
demonstration of this problem. In our view, the failure of the SGP to produce 
the desired sound fiscal policy was not due to wrong targets but rather due to 
the fact that several governments have not pursued a strict course of budget 
consolidation – contrary to their repeated statements in various documents. 
Now that the rules have become softer, it is uncertain whether governments 
are more willing to stick to their commitments.  
 
 
ULRICH FRITSCHE, ALFRED STEINHERR (DIW), CATHERINE 
MATHIEU, HENRI STERDYNIAK (OFCE), MARKUS 
MARTERBAUER, EWALD WALTERSKIRCHEN (WIFO) 
A1.2 
Implementation 
of the Stability 
and Growth 
Pact: still an 
Effort to be 
made…  
 
The reform of the Stability and Growth Pact decided at the European Council 
of 22-23 March 2005 has been seen by most observers as a victory of the 
countries currently breaching the rules (Germany, France and Italy) and as an 
increased flexibility of the Pact. Some, like the ECB, see the agreement as 
threatening euro area stability, some others welcome it as a step towards a 
more economically based Pact. We will argue in this text that the lessons of the 
past have not been fully drawn and that economic pitfalls remain. We will 
make some suggestions for further reform.  
 
The agreement on the implementation of the SGP2
The Council reaffirms that the SGP is essential in the EMU macroeconomic 
framework, without commenting on why the Pact did not work. The Council 
states that the economic rationale of the budgetary rules must be enhanced but 
also that the 3per cent of GDP value for the deficit ratio and the 60per cent 
value for the debt ratio remain the centrepiece of multilateral surveillance. It 
has however been widely shown in the literature that the 3 per cent of GDP 
threshold for deficits has no economic rationale. Looking at the debt ratio 
makes sense, although it raises a number of issues we will address below.   
Part I of the agreement, ‘Improving governance’, is a set of responsibilities: 
the Commission and the Council respect ‘Member States’ responsibility to 
implement the policies of their choice within the limits set by the Treaty’; the 
Commission is the guardian of the Treaty; the Council exercises its margin of 
discretion; the Member States, the Council and the Commission implement the 
Treaty and the Pact. But Member States do not say why they have not 
been able to fulfil the requirements of the Pact (inappropriate domestic 
fiscal policies or inappropriate fiscal rules?). Item 1.4 invites new 
governments to show continuity with the budgetary targets decided by the 
former government. We do not think this constraint is consistent with 
democratic rules and that newly elected governments will commit 
themselves to the former government’s objectives. Item 1.3 addresses, 
with no precision, the inadequacy between the concept of public deficit in 
national accounts and the objectives of mutual surveillance. We agree that 
there is a need for a new concept of public deficit, without one-off 
measures, but also without debt depreciation or public investment as 
long as there is a significant social rate of return. But why not open 
widely this Pandora’s box?  
Part II, ‘Strengthening the preventive arm’, accepts to define medium term 
objectives (MTO) differentiated for each Member State. But the range goes 
only from -1 per cent of GDP for low debt/high potential growth 
                                                 
2 See ‘Improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact’, ECOFIN Council report to the 
European Council, 21 March 2005.  
 
72 Economic Assessment of the Euro Area 
countries to balance or surplus for high debt/low potential growth 
countries. These limits have no economic rationale. Why not consider 
the golden rule for public finance, or a deficit stabilising the public debt 
ratio at a reasonable level (i.e. an objective for the structural deficit of 
around 2 per cent for a country with a nominal growth of 4 per cent and 
a target of 50 per cent for the debt ratio; of around 3  per cent for a 
country with a nominal growth of 7.5  per cent and a target of 40 per cent 
for the debt ratio)?  
The implicit liabilities from ageing populations will be taken into account. 
But why not take into account the social contributions that people will 
pay to have a satisfying level of pension and health insurance? Countries 
with generous public pensions systems may well have a higher tax 
burden than countries where employees need to save on an individual 
basis in view of retirement or health spending. There is no certainty that 
countries (like the UK) projecting very low levels of public pensions, 
hence having a very small implicit debt, will be able to let a significant 
and growing part of their population living in poverty. How will the 
Commission address this social risk?  
Member states having not reached their MTO should make a budgetary 
effort of 0.5 per cent of GDP per year (in cyclically adjusted and excluding 
one-off measures balances). The effort should be higher in positive output gap 
periods, smaller in bad times. But potential output and the economic cycle 
are difficult to assess. Most methods are based on the assumption that 
the economy fluctuates around equilibrium at typical business cycle 
frequencies. Therefore extraordinary stagnation periods are from a 
methodological point of view difficult to grasp – as well as astonishingly 
long boom periods. The Commission’s current estimates point to small 
output gaps. Even if the unemployment rate is high, a short period of 
growth will lead output to stand above its potential level. However if the 
estimated potential growth rate is given for granted and forms the base 
of fiscal policy, this method implies that past slow growth is necessarily 
reproduced in the future. The experience has shown that Member States 
will not undertake restrictive fiscal policies in bad times and will not use 
all their room for manoeuvre to pursue an arbitrary ‘close to balance or 
in surplus’ medium term  objective. It would be reasonable to require no 
reduction in the structural deficit in bad times. 
Structural reforms, in particular pension reforms introducing a mandatory, 
fully funded pillar, will be taken into account if they raise potential growth and 
induce long-term savings in the long run. The design of the Social Security 
system is a national choice and there is no justification for a European 
rule to provide incentives for a fully funded system.   
Part III is entitled ‘Improving the implementation of the excessive deficit 
procedure’. The Commission will prepare a report if the deficit exceeds 3 per 
cent. A small and temporary breaching of the rule will be allowed if it is due to 
negative growth or a strong negative output gap. The proposal made by 
France, Germany and Italy to automatically withdraw certain categories of 
expenditure from the deficit has not been accepted. But the Commission 
report will take account of “all other relevant factors”: policies implemented in 
the framework of the Lisbon agenda, R&D spending, public investments, 
economic situation or debt sustainability. Member States will be able to put 
forward other factors like budgetary efforts for international solidarity or for 
European goals or for the unification of Europe. The cost of the introduction 
of a compulsory, fully funded pension pillar would also be taken in account. 
These elements may prevent to launch the EDP if the excess is limited and 
temporary. They could also allow for longer adjustment paths to bringing 
deficits below 3 per cent. 
On the one hand, the Commission keeps the right to prepare a report 
for each country breaching the ceiling and will be entitled to send 
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directly an early warning. On the other and, the state concerned will be 
entitled to justify its fiscal policy by output gap, public investment,  
contribution to the EU budget or defence spending, or by the cost of 
Unification (for Germany) or other reasons... So the implementation of 
the EDP will not be automatic. It will require a specific judgement on 
the economic context and policy choices of the state concerned. How 
can peer countries condemn the policy run by an elected government, if 
this policy does not generate negative externalities for them? 
This agreement may be interpreted in two ways. It may be viewed as a 
death of the pact: rules are no more rigid; Member States sovereignty on 
domestic fiscal policy has been reaffirmed; the medium-term target of 
budgetary position in balance becomes less binding. A country breaching the 3 
per cent of GDP threshold for deficits will be entitled to justify it with 
economic conditions, specific spending measures or undergoing reforms. But 
one may also consider that the reform still lacks economic rationale: there is no 
reflection on the objective of fiscal policy or on the measurement of the 
output gap; the softening of the MTO is very limited; the requested annual 0.5 
per cent decrease in structural deficits to GDP ratios, remains. The 60 per cent 
threshold, long-term sustainability, the 0.5 per cent of GDP requested 
budgetary efforts and more restrictive fiscal policies in good times mean that 
governments will have to justify in permanence domestic fiscal developments 
before the Commission and peer countries. The Pact would remain a factor of 
permanent tensions in Europe. 
About the ECB’s Reaction 
The ECB has expressed strong worries about the SGP reform, fearing that 
the reform will undermine price stability in the Union. But there is no direct 
link between public deficits or debts and inflation, as shown by Germany or 
Belgium. Public deficits do not have inflationary consequences if private 
domestic demand is subdued.  
Towards a new Pact… 
According to us, fiscal policies in Europe must be implemented at three levels. 
Each Member State must keep the responsibility of its domestic fiscal policy 
and decide on issues like the amount of public expenditure, the quality of 
public finances, intergenerational equity. Fiscal choices need to reflect the 
votes from the people. National autonomy in fiscal policy must be reaffirmed. 
In order to facilitate the visibility of fiscal policy, each government could 
announce its fiscal rules and commitments, i.e. the way in which it intends to 
ensure public finance sustainability. Governments could present a structural 
expenditure path, where public expenses grow generally at a rate consistent 
with nominal trend growth, and structural taxation rules, consistent with debt 
sustainability, so that automatic stabilisers and discretionary policies could play. 
Governments could have the objective of stabilising the debt level at a 
satisfactory level (50 per cent of GDP for instance, which would authorize an 
average structural deficit of 2 per cent of the GDP in a country growing at a 
nominal rate of 4 per cent) or to limit the average level of structural deficit to 
public investment (the golden rule for public finance would ensure 
sustainability since public debt would be equal to public capital stock). These 
objectives could be revised according to macroeconomic developments in the 
medium term. In the short run, automatic stabilisers and discretionary policies 
should be allowed to run freely. In order to facilitate the visibility of fiscal 
policy, national governments could announce clearly which measures are 
transitory and discretionary.   
In the current level of European integration, European authorities should 
intervene only to prevent the emergence of negative externalities. The 
European authorities should ask for tighter fiscal polices only in countries 
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where inflation is too high, the current account deficit too large or where 
public debt becomes unsustainable. The decision must be based on a precise 
macroeconomic analysis, non on arbitrary criteria.  
Besides, we think economic co-operation would be useful within the 
Eurogroup with the ECB agreeing to dialogue. The Eurogroup and ECB could 
discuss the European economic situation, agree on the impulses needed at the 
European level, discuss how the impulses may be shared between monetary 
policy and domestic fiscal policies. This co-operation should not focus on 
public finance criteria, but should target the 3 per cent economic growth of the 
Lisbon strategy.  
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